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CONVENTION INFORMATION
The 59th Annual Convention of The Colorado Bar Association
will be held October 17 through 19, 1957, at the Broadmoor Hotel,
Colorado Springs. The following procedures will be strictly ob-
served in the handling of reservations for this convention.
1. All requests for reservations must be sent to the Secretary
of The Colorado Bar Association, 525 Mile High Center, Denver.
2. No block reservations will be recognized, but each member
of the Association desiring reservations must send in his own re-
quest by United States mail.
3. Each reservation request must be accompanied by a deposit
of $17. This deposit will not be credited to the hotel bill (the Broad-
moor has a policy against accepting advances on room rent) but
will cover a registration fee of $7 and one ticket each to the Friday
and Saturday luncheons ($2.50 each), the Saturday Night Banquet
($4), the President's Reception on Thursday night, the Denver Law
Club Show on Friday night, and the Grand Ball on Saturday night.
4. In making your request for accommodations at the Broad-
moor, please specify (1) the type of room desired, (2) how many
will be in your party, (3) the dates of arrival and departure. Plan
to arrive early. This year the President's Reception will be on
Thursday night.
5. On April 15, 1957, all requests for reservations then in the
Secretary's office will be opened simultaneously. If the total num-
ber of requests accompanied by a proper deposit does not exceed
the number of rooms which the Broadmoor can make available, all
will be filled. If such requests exceed the number of rooms avail-
able, the rooms will be allocated to the various local bar associa-
tions, prorated according to the membership of each association.
Associations having more requests for reservations than rooms as-
signed may select by lot, or otherwise, the registrants to be ap-
proved. Such selection would be made by the local bar association
involved, with the results certified to the Secretary of The Colorado
Bar Association.
6. Letters requesting reservations will be sent by the Secretary
to the Broadmoor Hotel when approved in the above manner. The
Hotel will be responsible for the actual assignment of rooms.
7. Deposits will be returned to those not receiving reservations
unless they desire to leave their requests on file in the hope of
obtaining a reservation canceled by another. Those leaving their
deposits with the Bar Association Secretary will receive preference
in the assignment of canceled reservations.
8. After a reservation is confirmed NO DEPOSIT WILL BE
RETURNED UNLESS A CANCELLATION IS RECEIVED PRIOR
TO SEPTEMBER 15, 1957.
No advance deposit will be required of members who do not
request reservations at the Broadmoor Hotel. Ample accommoda-
tions are available elsewhere in Colorado Springs, and the Con-
vention Committee will provide information at a later date to any-
one desiring such facilities.
Requests for accommodations at the Broadmoor Hotel will now
be received by the Bar Association Secretary.





A STATEMENT BY THE EDITORS
In October, 1949 when the University of Denver College of Law
was taken into partnership with the Denver and Colorado bar asso-
ciations in the publication of Dicta, it was felt by all concerned
that the project was a worthy one to further an even closer re-
lationship between the practicing profession and the law school.
That objective has been well served in the intervening years. Now
we may report that another partner has in effect been added to the
venture.
Effective June 15, 1957, Westminster College of Law and the
College of Law of the University of Denver will merge into a
single institution having both day and evening divisions. While the
name and traditions of Westminster will be preserved in various
ways, the merged institution will be known as the University of
Denver College of Law.
The merger has been fully approved by the Supreme Court of
Colorado, the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admis-
sions to the Bar of the American Bar Association and the Association
of American Law Schools. First classes will open on the University
of Denver Civic Center Campus for both day and evening divi-
sions in September 1957.
Hailed by the legal profession and friends of both schools as a
most significant milestone in legal education, the merger will result
in establishing in Denver the only accredited law school having
both day and evening sessions in the area from Texas to the Cana-
dian border and from the Mississippi River to California. Plans are
underway for a beautiful law school building to be erected on the
Civic Center Campus in the near future. Present planning also in-
cludes the possibility of creating at the law school a regional law
center.
Of course students in both the day and evening divisions of
the consolidated school will be represented on the editorial staff of
Dicta and will be encouraged to submit contributions. It is there-
fore proper to speak of "another partner" in the publication of this
journal. A cordial welcome has been extended by the Denver and
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
By VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR.
Professor of Law, College of Law, Denver University.
This review covers the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Colorado from October 1, 1955 to January 1, 1957. It may, to some
extent, overlap the latest review in this field, but it was deemed
desirable to base the review upon the calendar year, rather than
upon a year commencing with the annual convention of the Colo-
rado Bar Association.
The cases will be analyzed as they interpret the Rules of Civil
Procedure, in numerical order. They are not arranged chronologi-
cally. All references to the Rules are based on the Rules of Civil
Procedure as they appear in volume one of Colorado Revised Stat-
utes 1953. Where there is no citation of the official Colorado reports
it is because of the fact that the case has not yet been reported
officially in the reports.
RULE 7 (d)
In Mesch v. Board of County Commissioners1 the Supreme
Court found a failure to comply strictly with the requirements of
Rule 7 (d), because of which there resulted a lack of jurisdiction
in the trial court. The court, pursuant to Rule 106 (a) (4) and (b)
dismissed the writ of error. It also remanded the case, with in-
structions to the trial court to set aside its decision and to dismiss
the proceeding.
RULE 8
Weick v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Company2 is of interest to the
profession for its discussion of the difference between a claim for
relief under the Rules and the old cause of action. The court point-
ed out that in order to state a claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief it is no longer necessary to elect a particular theory
or "cause of action," but that it is sufficient to clearly identify
the transactions which form the basis of the claim for relief and
that if relief is warranted under any theory of law by the evidence
offered, it should not be denied because of the selection of a wrong
"cause of action." The court then reaffirmed the views it had ex-
pressed earlier in the case of Bridges v. Ingram3 . The objection was
also made that the complaint failed to allege ultimate facts, but
the court held that under Rule 8 (e) (1) this objection was not
well taken.
Since Rule 8 (c) specifically requires that in pleading to a pre-
ceding pleading a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and
satisfaction, the question may well arise whether a deficiency in
the pleading in this respect may be cured by the introduction of
evidence to show an accord and satisfaction, where no objection is
made to such evidence. In Metropolitan State Bank v. Cox 4 the
court held that under these circumstances the issue is properly
1 133 Colo. 223, 293 P.2d 300 (1956,.
2 303 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1956).
1122 Colo. 501, 223 P.2d 1051 (195C;).
'302 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1956).
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before the court, just as though it had been raised in the pleadings.
RULE 12.
The problem of general and special appearances seems to recur
in various garbs. It had to be dealt with in the case of Treadwell v.
District Court,5 a proceeding in the nature of prohibition under
Rule 106 (4). The court pointed out that a so-called general appear-
ance filed after a motion to quash service of process for lack of
jurisdiction over the person had no effect, because the Rules make
no provision for general and special appearances. It was held that
such motion having been made before answer, it properly raised the
question of jurisdiction and preserved it until the motion had been
disposed of. The case is also interesting because the court issued
its writ against the action of the district court which required the
defendant to answer, after holding that the general appearance
waived the motion to quash. The court found it to be a matter of
sufficient public interest to have the question of jurisdiction de-
termined before a trial on the merits, to justify the issuance of
the writ under Rule 106 (4).
RULE 18
In the case of Gerbaz v. Hulsey,6 the plaintiffs joined two
claims arising out of the same alleged breach of contract and the
defendant moved that the plaintiffs be required to make an election
of their remedies. The court determined that the claims were not
inconsistent but that they were simply claims for damages arising
out of one breach and were properly joined under Rule 18.
However, the requirements of Rule 10 (b) that the claims or
defenses be set forth in separate paragraphs and counts are in no
way abrogated by the liberal joinder provisions of Rule 18 and
such claims must be separately stated and relief be expressly re-




In Centennial Casualty Co. v. Lacey,8 an action by a car owner
against an insurance carrier under the theft clause of an auto-
mobile policy, the court determined that the holder of a chattel
mortgage on the car was not an indispensable party under Rule
19 (a).
RULE 20
Where a large number of parties join or are joined in an action
it may be a difficult problem to determine whether the require-
ments of this rule regarding transactions or occurrences or
series thereof and common questions of law or fact can be satis-
fied. In Western Homes v. District Court9 some 232 plaintiffs joined
in one action to recover damages for alleged fraudulent misrepre-
sentations. The court ably discussed, at too great length to be set
out here, the meaning of a series of transactions and what con-
5133 Co!o. 520, 297 P.2d 891 (1956).
0 132 Colo. 359, 288 P.2d 357 (1955).
r300 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1956).
s 133 Colo. 357, 295 P.2d 690 (1956).
133 Colo. 304, 296 P.2d 460 (1956).
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stitute common questions of law or fact. The court also discussed
the requirements of Rule 9 (b) as to the sufficiency of allegations
of fraud.
RULE 46
Rule 46 provides that there shall be no prejudice to a party
who fails to object to a ruling of the court when he has no oppor-
tunity to object to the ruling at the time it is made. In Brakhahn
v. Hildebrand0 the plaintiff made no objection to an instruction
on contributory negligence. There was no evidence of contributory
negligence which could have been imputed to plaintiff and it was
undisputed that the plaintiff was afforded no opportunity to reg-
ister an objection. The court held that under Rule 46 it was at lib-
erty to disregard the failure to make an objection under these cir-
cumstances.
RULE 50
Under the provisions of Rule 50 (b) a party who has moved
for a directed verdict may, within ten days after the reception of
the verdict, move to have the verdict and any judgment entered
thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with
his motion for a directed verdict. The Rule also provides that a mo-
tion for a new trial may be joined with this motion or a new trial
may be prayed for in the alternative." It seems to be established





MA 3-1206 Title Insurance Co.
725- 18th St., Denver
or
Security Abstract Company
BE 7-2756 of Jefferson County
1595 Wadsworth, Lakewood
REECORD ABSTRACT AND
SUR CE CO. *Denver - *Adams - *Arapahoe - *Jefferson
DICTA
Mar.-Apr., 1957
by numerous cases in the federal courts that the filing of a motion
for a directed verdict is a condition precedent to the right to file
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In the case of
Ross v. Arrow Manufacturing Co.," the defendant had failed to
move for a directed verdict at any time during the trial but never-
theless filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or,
in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court did not rule on
the alternative motion and after the case had reached the Supreme
Court the defendant in the trial court filed a petition to remand
to the trial court for a ruling on the alternative motion. This pe-
tition was denied and leave was granted to file briefs on the ques-
tion of the propriety of the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and the case is still pending on that question. The high
court, however, said that under the Rule the defendant was not
entitled to file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
unless he had filed a motion for a directed verdict. If this turns out
to be the holding of the court on this point it will be in accord with
the view expressed many times by the federal courts.'3
In the case of Grange Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Golden Gas Co."
the Supreme Court once more passed upon a question which would
seem to be well settled both in Colorado and in the federal courts. 5
The defendant made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, joining with it the alternative motion for a new trial. The
motion for judgment was granted but no ruling was made on the
alternative motion. The court held, in line with its previous ruling,
that the granting of the motion for judgment does not effect an
automatic denial of the alternative motion for a new trial and that
the trial court should have ruled on the defendant's motion for a
new trial at the same time.
RULE 51
In Stephens v. Lung, 6 the record showed objections to the giv-
ing of certain instructions but showed no objection to an instruction
on contributory negligence, which was claimed to be erroneous.
Counsel insisted that the reference in the record to other instruc-
tions was inadvertent and that all arguments had been directed to
the one on contributory negligence. The court held that it was error
to give the instruction and that substantial justice required that
the error be noticed in spite of the absence of a formal objection of
record.
Again, in the case of Warner v. Barnard7 the court noticed an
error in the giving of an instruction where no objection was made
to it at the trial, pointing out that Rule 51 is subject to the qualifi-
cation that the court, on its own motion, may notice manifest error
whether raised by counsel or not, if the same appears of record and
133 Colo. 531, 299 P.2d 502 (1956).
Barron v. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1079. See, e.g., Guerrero v. American.
Hawaiian S. S. Co., 222 .F2d 238 (9th Cir. 19).
14 133 Colo. 537, 298 P.2d 950 (1956).
. See Montgomery Ward v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940); Singer v. Chitwood, 126 Colo. 173,
247 P.2d 905 (1952).
16 133 Colo. 560, 298 P.2d 960 (1956).
17 304 P.2d 898 (Colo. 1956).
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if justice will be served thereby, especially in view of the provisions
of Rule 111 (f) which permit the court, in its discretion, to notice
any error appearing of record.
RULE 54
Since Rule 54 (c) provides that every final judgment (except
by default) shall grant the relief to which the party is entitled,
even if such relief has not been demanded, the decision in Regin-
nitter v. Fowler' seems to be based upon sound principles. The
court held that to determine whether the action of the trial court
in sustaining a motion to dismiss is correct, the question is whether,
in the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to any
relief, and if, upon any theory of law relief should be granted, then
the motion to dismiss cannot be sustained and appropriate relief
should be granted.
RULE 57
In People v. Baker19 the court was called upon to interpret Rule
57 (f) and held that the absence of persons whose presence was re-
quired because they had or claimed to have interests which might
be affected prevented their being bound by the action of the court
and that therefore the action should not be maintained because the
judgment would not terminate the uncertainty nor determine the
controversy, nor would it serve any useful purpose in clarifying
and settling the legal relations in issue.
132 Colo. 489, 290 P.2d 223 (1955).
1' 297 P.2d 273 (Colo. 1956).
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Since Rule 111 permits a writ of error from the Supreme Court
to a final judgment, the question has arisen with some frequency
whether or not an order granting a new trial is a final judgment
to which a writ of error will lie. In Gonzales v. Trujillo," the most
recent case to raise the point, the Supreme Court once again held
that the granting of a motion for a new trial is not a final judgment
and is therefore not reviewable on writ of error. The court dis-
missed the writ of error.
In Deeds v. Proudfit2l the court re-affirmed what it called a
long established rule that when the district court has had no oppor-
tunity to pass upon a question, it may not be urged in the Supreme
Court.
In Kopff v. Judd 2 the court again determined that no writ of
error lies to a final judgment (here, an order dissolving a writ of
attachment, which is a final judgment under Rule 102 (aa) where
no motion for a new trial was filed and the trial court made no
order dispensing with such motion. The court held, also, that under
Rule 102 (aa) compliance with Rule 59 (f) is essential to a right of
review by writ of error.
RULE 60
In Salter v. Board of County Commissioners" an action was
brought to vacate a judgment which had been entered nineteen
months before the suit was brought and satisfied five months be-
fore the suit, the judgment debtor having voluntarily paid the
judgment. The court dismissed the writ of error on the ground that
the order of the trial court denying the vacation of the judgment
was not a final judgment from (sic) 24 which a writ of error will
lie. The court also stated that under Rule 60 (b) a motion to vacate
a judgment must be filed within a reasonable time and further,
that when the judgment debtor voluntarily has paid the judgment
he is thereafter barred from questioning technicalities, either of
pleading or form, incident to its entry.
e' 133 Colo. 64, 291 P.2d 1063 (1956).
s' 133 Colo. 85, 293 P.2d 643 (1956).
133 Colo. 138, 292 P.2d 345 (1956).
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In Burr v. Allard25 there was filed what was apparently a time-
ly motion to set aside a judgment, the defendant stating that he had
a good and valid defense to the action. The motion was -denied,
since the grounds upon which it was based consisted of only legal
conclusions, with no supporting facts to show a defense. The court
held that, under these circumstances, there was no abuse of dis-
cretion in denying the motion, since, under earlier Colorado de-
cisions the defendant had the burden to establish grounds for relief
under Rule 60 and had failed to sustain that burden.
RULE i05
In Meaker v. District Court" the plaintiff had filed a lis pen-
dens under Rule 105 (f). The district court ordered the plaintiff to
release the interest claimed by him in the property and the plain-
tiff then filed in the Supreme Court a proceeding in the nature of
prohibition to stay the proceedings in the district court in order to
prevent it from enforcing its order by contempt or other means.
The Supreme Court refused to entertain the proceedings on the
ground thata writ of error to any judgment of contempt that might
be entered was a speedy and adequate remedy.
RULE 106
In Womack v. Grandbush2 7 the.judgment creditor, proceeding
under Rule 106 (a) (5), filed his petition to compel the wife of the
judgment debtor to show cause why she should not be bound by
the judgment, basing his petition on allegations that the wife was,
in fact, the partner of the judgment debtor. The trial court dis-
missed the petition. The Supreme Court, in interpreting the rule,
held that the judgment creditor was entitled to have recourse to the
rule, under these circumstances.
RULE 111
There have been eight cases calling for an interpretation of
Rule 111, during the period covered. Two of the cases involve for-
malities connected with the entry of the judgment.
In Jones v. Galbasini28 the record showed the trial court's writ-
ten ruling, the court's minute order to the clerk to enter a judgment
m 133 Colo. 270, 293 P.2d 969 (1956).
w 300 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1956).
' 298 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1956).
2299 P.2d 503 (Colo. 1956).
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of dismissal and the judgment so entered by the clerk. The ques-
tion related to the timeliness of the writ of error and the court held
that this record showed a final judgment to which a writ of error
would lie.
In Green v. Jones29 the court denied a motion to dismiss a writ
of error based on the ground that it had not been sued out within
ninety days of the date on which the motion for a new trial had
been denied. This was true, but the application for the writ of error
and the filing of the record on error had occured within ninety
days of the date of entry of judgment, which included interest on
the verdict. This the record showed. The court pointed out that the
final judgment had actually been entered within ninety days of the
writ of error and that therefore the writ of error was not subject
to the motion to dismiss on the ground presented. This case is of
interest in view of the decisions in this state that where the judg-
ment is entered before the ruling on the motion for a new trial
that until a motion' for a new trial is determined a judgment is not
final.3
0
Four of the cases concerned the problem of what constitutes
a final judgment to which a writ of error properly lies. In the case
of Hizel v. Hizel3' the problem was one of a general nature, resolved
in favor of expediency. In dismissing, as premature, a writ of error
to review the action of the district court in refusing to make certain
interlocutory orders concerning alimony, the court said:
"In a sense, some of the orders involved, concerning alimony,
have such finality that, strictly speaking, they are orders, and
judgments thereon to which a writ of error may lie; however,
it is more desirable that these matters await final disposition of
the case on its merits."2
In McMullin v. Denver33 no review of the final judgment was
sought, but a motion was made to modify such final judgment or
decree. The court said: "a writ of error will not lie from (sic) a
ruling subsequently entered refusing to modify or change the final
decree."3
4
In Rigel v. Kaveny35 the writ of error was issued solely to re-
view the propriety of an order appointing a receiver. There had
been no trial on any issue of the case. The plaintiff in error sought
a review of rulings of the trial court on motion to strike portions
of the answer. The appellate court held that such rulings would
not be considered, since such rulings did not end the action, prior
to the entry of a final judgment in the case.
The latest case on this problem is People v. District Court."c
Here the court said that where the district court had made an un-
authorized order remanding a cause to the Public Utilities Com-
mission with directions to hold a hearing in conjunction with cer-
tain findings, such order or "decision" was not a final judgment
29304 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1956).
2
0See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Hall, 116 Colo. 566, 183 P.2d 986 (1947).
81 132 Colo. 379, 288 P.2d 354 (1955).
8 Id. at 381, 288 P.2d at 355.
133 Colo..297, 294 P.2d 918 (1956).
Id. at 300, 294 P.2d at 918.
• 133 Colo. 556, 298 P.2d 396 (1956)
303 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1956).
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to which a writ of error could be directed, since it did not put an
end to the suit. In all of the above cases, the essential element of
finality was lacking.
Two of the cases involving Rule 111 related to the actual form
of the record in the Supreme Court and illustrate again the im-
portance of a compliance with the requirements of the rule.
In the record in Allison v. Heller17 the Summary of Argument
which, under Rule 111 (f) is required to state "clearly and briefly
the grounds upon which he relies," comprised three full typewritten
pages and were, in essence, arguments. The court pointed out that
the Summary of Argument supplants what were formerly desig-
nated Assignments of Error and, later, Specification of Points and
that the Summary of Argument here did not comply with the
rules. The court further held that to state that the verdict (in this
case there was no verdict but findings by the court) was contrary
to the law, to the evidence and to the law and the evidence was
meaningless, and so general as to cover any possible question and,
therefore, would not be noticed or considered. The court reached
the same conclusion in the case of Phipps v. Hurd.8
RULE 112
The three cases which deal with this rule all relate to sub-
division (f) of the rule, which concerns the reporter's transcript.
In Bonham v. City of Aurora3 the entry of judgment for the
defendant, based upon findings in its favor, contained no specifica-
tion of time for tendering a reporter's transcript. The court held
that under these circumstances the time fixed by Rule 112 (f) con-
trolled, and since no extension of time for lodging the transcript
had been allowed, a transcript filed after sixty days from the date
of judgment could not be considered.
In Brennan Construction Co. v. Colorado Springs Co.,40 after
the issuance of the writ of error, the reporter's transcript, which
had been lodged by the plaintiff in error, was stricken, on motion.
A motion to dismiss the writ of error was then filed and in grant-
ing it the court held that where the only grounds for reversal would
be found in such reporter's transcript there was nothing for the
court to consider. The record of the clerk of the trial court dis-
closed no basis for a reversal.
In Ratliff v. Davis41 the trial court had allowed sixty days with-
in which to prepare and tender a reporter's transcript. No extension
of time had been granted. The transcript, as filed in the Supreme
Court, failed to show that it had been lodged in the trial court or
that notice of lodging had ever been given to opposing counsel,
although it did bear the signature of the trial judge affixed at a
time which was later than sixty days after the order. Because the
transcript had not been tendered within the time limited by the
order of the trial court it was disregarded by the Supreme Court.
37 132 Colo. 415, 289 P.2d 160 (1955).
'~ 133 Colo. 547, 297 P.2d 1048 (1956).
' 133 Colo. 276, 294 P.2d 267 (1956).
:o 133 Colo. 301, 295 P.2d 686 (1956).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By HAROLD E. HURST
Professor of Law, University of Denver.
During the period from October, 1955, to the end of 1956, rela-
tively few decisions on points of constitutional law have been
handed down by the Colorado Supreme Court. Important decisions
invalidated minimum resale price maintenance and the motor
vehicle dealer Sunday closing law. In another decision, the court
defined "felony" in a way which reportedly affects a number of
prisoners in the state penitentiary, and in the principal case re-
sulted in the release of one prisoner, convicted under the habitual
criminal statute. Other decisions dealt with self-incrimination,
representation by counsel, exemption of charitable and educational
organizations from the property tax, and refunds of taxes paid into
the old age pension fund.
MINIMUM RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
In an unanimous decision in the case of Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp. v. Francis,1 the court ruled that the so-called "non-
signer" clause of the Colorado Fair Trade Act 2 was unconstitutional
for several reasons. The facts of the case are simple. Plaintiff and
Fisher Denver Co., not a party to the action, had entered into a
contract which purportedly obligated Fisher to maintain a minimum
resale price on products manufactured by the plaintiff. The de-
fendant had not signed such an agreement with the plaintiff. The
statute in question provided that, "Wilfully and knowingly ad-
vertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than
the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provisions of this Act, whether the person so advertising, offering
for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair
competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged
thereby." The defendant, Francis, had lawfully obtained a stock
of merchandise manufactured by the plaintiff, and was reselling
such merchandise at prices less than those established in the
contract between the plaintiff, and Fisher Denver Co. The plain-
tiff sought an injunction and the defendant resisted on the ground
that the restriction on his right to resell at any price was uncon-
stitutional.
After noting that the declared legislative purpose in enacting
the statute was "to safeguard the public against the monopolies
and to foster and encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and
discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is
destroyed or prevented,"' the court made it plain that in its view
the police power of the legislature extended to price fixing only of
such businesses as might be said to be "affected with a public in-
terest," and that the business of selling fire arms and ammunition,
1301 P.2d 139 (Colo. 1956).
2Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 55-1-4 (1953).
3 Ibid.
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 55-2-16 (1953).
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the products of the plaintiff, was not affected with a public inter-
est. Rather, it was the opinion of the court that minimum resale
price maintenance was calculated to restrict competition, create a
monopoly, increase prices to consumers, and make a mockery out
of the declared purpose of the Act-to protect consumers. The
non-signer clause of the statute was, therefore, beyond the police
power of the State as applied to the products of the plaintiff.
But, the court went further. It ruled that even if the non-signer
clause could be deemed within the power of the legislature, the
statute must fall as an unlawful delegaion of legislative power to
private individuals without any standards whatsoever within which
-or even whether-minimum resale prices shall be fixed. The
crux of the matter was that "We must look not to the statute, but
to the contract between plaintiff and Fisher to determine the
Oetopuso outlets are a real
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ards, now is the time to wire for full Housepower
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minimum price, below which the defendant shall not sell."'5
MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS SUNDAY CLOSING LAW
By a bare majority the Supreme Court held invalid the statute
prohibiting operation of new and used car establishments, a de-
cision which, at the time of this writing, was under reconsideration
on a petition for rehearing. The case, Mosko v. Dunbar,6 began as
an action for a declaratory judgment, the plaintiff alleging that
the Sunday closing law, applying only to new and used car dealers,
violated the state constitutional prohibition against special legisla-
tion 7 and the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
The court considered the principal question to be:
"Does a statute which prohibits a dealer in motor vehicles
from operating his place of business on Sundays have a real
or substantial relation to the promotion and protection of the
public health, the public morals, the public safety, or the
general welfare of the people?"8
It was not indicated by the court just what provisions of the
Constitutions were violated by the Sunday closing law. The pro-
nouncement simply was that "Application of fundamental princi-
ples of constitutional law compel a negative answer to the ques-
tion."9 The language in which the question and answer were couched
is the standard language of police power and due process of law,
not of special legislation and equal protection. However, in a
special concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sutton expressly declared
the statute invalid as being in violation of both the due process
clause and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of Article V, section 25, of the state Constitution prohibiting
special legislation. To him, there was no reasonable basis, as a
means of protecting the public health, safety, welfare and morals,
for discriminating against motor vehicle dealers when there were
no more apparent dangers in selling motor vehicles on Sunday
than in selling "houses or tractors, or horses or boats on Sunday."'10
SELF-INCRIMINATION
In People v. Schneider,1 the defendants, being county commis-
sioners, were subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury investi-
gating the affairs of the Board of County Commissioners. They ap-
peared and testified without being advised of their constitutional
immunity from self-incrimination. When indictments were returned
against them for alleged offenses evidenced by the testimony
given and the records produced by the defendants before the
grand jury, the defendants moved that the indictments be quashed.
The trial court granted the motion and the People procured a writ
of error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it was in
violation of Article II, Section 18, of the state Constitution for the
State to subpoena and require the giving of testimony by one who
5 301 P.2d at 152.
. 8 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 439 (July 30, 1956).
7 Colo. Const. Art. V, § 25 (1876).
'8 Colo. Bar Ass'n Ad,. Sh. at 440.
9 Ibid.
10 Id. at 442.
11 133 Colo. 173, 292 P.2d 982 (1956).
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is under investigation and to use the information so obtained in a
criminal proceeding against the witness. This was so even though
it appears that the defendants did not claim immunity at any time
prior to the motion to quash, but where nothing appears in the
record except the giving of the testimony to indicate that the de-
fendants waived the privilege.
In another case in which the privilege against self-incrimination
was invoked,12 the prosecution sought to place a mask on the face
of the defendant, charged with robbery, in the manner in which
such a mask had been worn by the robber. To this, counsel for the
defendant said, "We object to it." When the mask was in place
and the defendant was asked to stand up, counsel interposed, "We
object to his standing up, as being improper." Both objections were
overruled, the defendant was convicted, and in the Supreme Court
the defendant assigned the rulings as error, apparently upon the
ground that such procedure violated the prohibition against com-
pelling a person to testify against himself.13 The reason for affirm-
ing the rulings of the trial court seems to be that unless reasons
for the objections are obvious, the grounds therefor must be stated
with sufficient particularity as to call the attention of the court
to the specific points relied upon, and only the grounds specified
need be considered. However, the court ruled that even if a proper
objection had been interposed, no constitutional right of the de-
fendant had been violated. The prohibition against self-incrimina-
tion was said to relate to testimonial evidence, not to the exclusion
of the body as evidence when such evidence may be relevant and
material.
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL
One case reached the court in which it was called upon to de-
cide the adequacy of counsel in a murder trial." At the arraignment
of the defendant, a member of the bar of New Mexico appeared
for the defendant and entered a plea of not guilty. The lawyer was
admitted by order of the Supreme Court to represent the defendant
in the trial. Upon trial, a verdict of guilty was returned. On writ
of error prosecuted by new counsel of the Colorado bar, it was
assigned as error that the trial court failed to appoint competent
12 Vigil v. People, 300 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1956).
tm
Colo. Const. Art. II, § 18 (1876).
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local counsel. The contention was that the representation of the
defendant was obviously inadequate and that trial of the defendant
under the circumstances was a denial of due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment and a violation of Article II, Section 16,
of the state Constitution. Without discussion or statement of rea-
sons specifically addressed to the constituional questions, the
court simply held that there was no constitutional error.
EXEMPTION FROM STATE PROPERTY TAXES
In a case of first impression in Colorado, the Supreme Court
decided the applicability of the constitutional exemption of property
of charitable, religious and educational organizations from state
property taxes, where the organization and the users of the property
are non-residents of the State. 15 The plaintiff, Young Life Cam-
paign, was a Texas non-profit corporation which owned ranches in
Colorado allegedly used solely for benevolent, educational and re-
ligious purposes. Of the entire attendance at the summertime pro-
grams of the corporation, only about two percent came from
Colorado. Property taxes were collected from the plaintiff who
brought this action to recover back the taxes, claiming exemption
under the Colorado Constitution which provides:
"The following classes of property shall be exempt from gen-
eral taxation:
2. The property, real and personal, that is used solely and
exclusively for religious worship ...
4. Property, real and personal, that is used for strictly
charitable purposes."'16
Although the evidence showed that there was some use of the
properties in question by vacationers on a commercial basis, the
court passed the question whether the properties were used "solely
and exclusively" for religious worship or "strictly" charitable pur-
poses and held that:
"it was not the intention of the people of the State of Colo-
rado by the adoption of its constitutional provision . . .or by
legislative act to relieve a non-profit foreign corporation, be it
charitable, religious or educational, of the payment of taxes and
' sYoung Life Campaign v. Board of County Com'rs. 300 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1956).
6Colo. Const., Art. X, § 5 (1876).
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thereby increase the tax burden upon its resident taxpay-
ers . ... 17
The conclusion was based on the theory that the intent and purpose
of the exemption was to relieve from taxation only those organiza-
tions which contributed to the welfare of Colorado citizens, re-
lieving the State of such burdens. Since the benefits provided by
the plaintiff were enjoyed almost entirely by non-residents, the
corporation did not qualify as one to which the Constitution ex-
tended exemption.
"FELONY" DEFINED
The Colorado Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 4, provides
that "The term felony, wherever it may occur in this constitution,
or the laws of the State, shall be construed to mean any criminal
offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary,
and none other." In Smalley v. People 18 the court set aside a life
sentence imposed under the habitual criminal statute for a fourth
conviction of a felony. Smalley contended that his first conviction
for burglary and grand larceny were not convictions for felonies
because at the time he was under the age of twenty-one years and
the statutes"' substituted imprisonment in the reformatory for im-
prisonment in the penitentiary. The court set aside the life sentence
without discussion beyond stating in effect that the language
of the Constitution was plain and should be construed in favor of
the accused.
REFUNDS OF TAXES FROM OLD AGE PENSION FUND
The Constitution, providing that "all money deposited in the
old age pension fund shall remain inviolate for the purpose for
which created, and no part thereof shall be transferred to any other
fund or used or appropriated for any other purpose," 2 does not
prevent the refund of taxes erroneously paid into the fund. In
State v. Newton 2 the Supreme Court held that the Article applies
only to taxes lawfully assessed and paid, not to taxes erroneously
assessed and paid on the theory that the constitutional provision
extended only to taxes lawfully or properly deposited in the fund.
"' 300 P.2d at 543.
18304 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1956).
"Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 39-10-1 (1953).
"Colo. Const. Art. XXIV, § 7 (1876).
218 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 205 (1956).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
PAUL F. GOLDSMITH
A. B. University of Denver, 1941; L.L. B. University of Denver, 1943;
Private practice, Denver, 1945-48; Member of firm of Sears and Gold-
smith, Denver, since 1948.
1. DEALINGS UNDERST6OD NOT To IMPOSE DUTY To MAKE
COMPENSATION
The case of Heafer v. Gathers' involves the claim of an auto-
mobile repair man for rental of a substitute car loaned to a custom-
er while the customer's car was being repaired. The customer con-
tends the lending was understood not to involve any duty to pay
rental. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial on this question.
The confusion arises over a "counter slip" which was to have been
submitted to the insurance company to evidence rental expense
but ended up, slightly altered, as a bill to defendant. (This case
could have been discussed under the heading of Interpretation be-
low.)
2. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE INCLUDING:
(a) Promise for an act.
McCullough v. Thompson2
(See 4 (a), below)
(b) Lapse of offer in:
1. Option to purchase Real Estate.
In the case of Miller v. Hiett3 there was apparently a month to
month rent agreement with an option to buy the subject real estate
and apply rental to the purchase price. After paying $100.00 per
month rent for six and one-half years, the tenant sues for specific
performance and loses. The best reason, though not clearly ad-
vanced in the report, to support the result of the case is that the
offer to sell, in the option, had lapsed and the tenants never, prior
to suit, accepted the offer or exercised the option. It is not sufficient
to state, as was done in this case, that (1) there was no considera-
tion for the option, and (2) that there was a lack of mutuality. The
monthly payments themselves could be consideration, and mutual-
ity is not necessary.
2. Offer to pay broker a commission on sale of real estate





(See 4 (a), below)
(c) Lapse of counter-offer.
In the case of Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez,6 Mar..
tinez' application for insurance was rejected by the defendant com-
pany. The company offered a policy with the premium "rated high
up." Martinez was injured in an automobile accident and died be-
1300 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1956).
:133 Colo. 352, 295 P.2d 221 (1956).
8 133 Colo. 576, 298 P.2d 394 (1956).
133 Colo. 382, 295 P.2d 1036 (1956).
5299 P.2d 120 (Colo. 1956).
8299 P.2d 507 (Colo. 1956).
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fore accepting the counter-offered policy and without having paid
the premium. The application provided: "That there shall be no
contract of insurance until a policy shall have been delivered to
me and the premium paid to the home office of said Company in
Lincoln, Nebraska, during my life time and in good health."7 On
the above showing judgment for plaintiff was reversed.
(d) QUERY: Is offer and acceptance necessary?
Kugel v. Young.8 This case is included here only to pinpoint the
court's statement in ruling on the petition for re-hearing. The case
arose on the question of automatic termination of a producers 88
oil and gas lease, "unless" specified delay rental payments were
made by a given date. The assignees of a part of the lease tendered
the second year delay rental on an incorrectly described part of the
total acreage and the lessors accepted and applied this tendered
rental without knowing the area covered by the assignment and
without intent to accept rental payment on less than the whole
tract. The court held that this constituted a continuance of the
lease as to the described portion and a surrender regarding the
omitted portion. On petition for re-hearing the problem of a
meeting of the minds, i. e., offer and acceptance of the "insuffi-
cient" delay rental was raised. The court stated that:
"where we have under consideration an already existing con-
tract partially performed, and under the facts and circum-
stances peculiarly applicable to this case, we cannot escape
the conclusion that the picture revealed, if not technically an
offer and acceptance, is so closely in the nature thereof that
the result is the same."9
3. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
In Williams v. Lundquist,0 the plaintiff sued for fifty per cent
of the profits from operation of a kitchen, operated in connection
with a bar. The plaintiff contended, and the court found, that only
cost of food and kitchen-help salaries were to be deducted from the
gross sales receipts from food. This was shown by parol evidence.
The case was reversed because the trial court did not deduct the
value of "house meals" for kitchen-help as part of, and an addi-
tional, expense of "kitchen salaries."
Note: the kitchen was operated'at a $3,400 loss if all operating
expenses are considered. Moral: Define kitchen expenses to include
a fair share of all overhead.
In United Oil Production Co. v. Quinn," Quinn's investment
was a pre-organization investment used by the president of United
to secure other investors. However, the company in which Quinn
expected to receive a one per cent share was never formed. In-
stead, United took over the project of the contemplated company
and Quinn was told her money was consumed by pre-organization
costs. The court gave Quinn a one per cent share in the project as
carried out by United, since in equity her money had been diverted
to United when United took over the contemplated project which
Id. at 508.
s 132 Colo. 529, 291 P.2d 695 (1955)
'Id. at 547, 291 P.2d at 704.
lo133 Colo. 379, 295 P.2d 1035 (1956).
z1133 Colo. 430, 297 P.2d 270 (1956).
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promotional scheme to drill and develop a Rangely oil and gas
lease.)In Weick .V. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co.,12 plaintiff's intestate
had been the salesmanager for defendant. At the time of decedent's
death, it is admitted that he was entitled to in excess of $6,000.00
for accumulated commissions due and payable at the date of
his death. The dispute concerns plaintiff's claim for an additionalamount of commissions on sales which were not consummated, by
delivery, until after decedent's death, but with respect to which
contracts of purchase or orders, had been signed prior to decedent's
death. The trial court held that plaintiff had not made out a prima
facie case which would justify a recovery of these additional com-
missions and entered judgment for only those commissions ad-
mitted to be due. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and
remanded the cause for presentation of evidence on behalf of de-
fendant company. The reason being: (1) Unless there is an agree-ment clearly providing to the contrary, a person selling on a com-
mission basis is entitled to commission when a sale is made, ir-
respective of when shipment takes place, (2) The complaint of
plaintiff stated a claim against the company which was supportedby evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
"9 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 40 (1956).
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4. CONDITIONS To CONTRACTUAL DUTY OF IMMEDIATE PERFORMANCE
While some of these cases could be discussed under the heading
of offer and acceptance or consideration they are more significantly
handled here.
(a) Three cases involving real estate broker's commission:
(i) In McCullough v. Thompson,13 the plaintiff, broker, se-
cured a purchaser according to the terms of the listing and a con-
tract was signed by the principals (sellers) and purchasers. The
principals refused to close on the accepted terms. The broker, cor-
rectly, was held to have earned his commission and the refusal of
the principals to close on a contract they had approved could not




defeat the broker's claim. The Supreme Court found that the con-
ditions of the statute14 had been met.
(ii) In another case for broker's commission the Supreme
Court held that the conditions of the same statute had not been
met. This was Ginsberg v. Frankenberg." The plaintiff, a licensed
broker and attorney, drew a non-exclusive listing and was to have
as his commission any excess over a stated price if sale was to a
buyer procured by the broker and disclosed to the principal, and
the excess over the stated price, but not less than "regular commis-
sion as provided by the Denver Board of Realtors" if sale to such
disclosed person was by the owner. No provision was made if sale
was through another broker. Another broker sold the property for
a price in excess .of any offers ever secured by the plaintiff, lbut
less than the price stated in the plaintiff's listing. The court af-
firmed a judgment of dismissal, stating that the listing had to be
construed against the one who drew it. The real basis for this
holding is that the plaintiff never produced the necessary buyer,
and never became entitled to a commission under the above statute.
In other words, it is either a case of no acceptance or non-perform-
ance of a condition.
(iii) Heady v. Tomlinson,6 is a case wherein a broker ten-
dered an offer to an owner at the request of a person who had been
negotiating with the owner. This owner is the present defendant.
The sale was closed and the broker was present at the closing. The
owner refused to pay the commission claimed and appealed from
an adverse judgment. In reversing the judgment, the Supreme
Court stated that even though there was a listing agreement signed
by the owner, the broker was not himself, nor by his efforts, re-
sponsible for the sale. Consequently, the broker was not entitled
to a commission.
(b) Condition precedent of notice of suit in public liability
insurance contract.
Ewing v. Colorado Farm Mut. Cas. Co.," concerns an action
against an insurance company whose policy contained the follow-
ing usual condition: "no action shall lie against the Company, un-
14Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117-2-1 (1953).
1 See note 4 supra.
"6299 P.2d 120 (Colo. 1956).
" 133 Colo. 447, 296 P.2d 1040 (1956).
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less as a condition precedent thereto, there shall have been full
compliance with all the terms of this policy."'18 One term of the
policy required the insured to give notice to the company in case
of suit against the insured. The trial court had dismissed the plain-
tiffs' action upon the plaintiffs' own evidence that (a) they were
judgment creditors of a person who was driving the insured ve-
hicle, on a mission of his own, not with direct or delegated author-
ity of the insured, and (b) no notice had been given to the insurer
of the prior action against the driver. In affirming the trial court's
judgment, the Supreme Court describes the plaintiffs as third-party
beneficiaries to the contract between the insured and the insurer,
who are required, as such beneficiaries, to prove performance of
conditions precedent, which they neither did nor alleged. As to the
statute, 9 the court stated "it is exquisitely calipered as an impon-
derable"20 but does not eliminate the condition of notice.
5. JOINT OBLIGATIONS
Womack v. Grandbush2' dealt with the right of a judgment
creditor of one partner to have a third person, a partner of the
judgment debtor, show cause under Rule 106 (a) (5)22 why such
other partner should not be bound by the original judgment. In
this case the original judgment was obtained on what appeared to
be an individual obligation, but facts disclosed in the trial of the
original action 23 indicate the obligation to have been a partnership
obligation. The order and judgment dismissing the petition was
reversed.
Note: Not all partnership obligations are joint and several. 24
See C.R.S. 76-1-1 (joint and several obligations) and compare C.R.S.
'53 104-1-15 (2). Colorado statutes provide that partners are liable
jointly, and not jointly and severally, 25 except when specified con-
ditions2 6 appear. The Rules of Civil Procedure do not change sub-
stantive law and Rule 106 (a) (5) should apply only where the
omitted party did not have to be made a party under the substan-
tive law or, if made a party, could not be served with process.
Otherwise Rule 106 (a) (5) would change the substantive stat-
utory law. Perhaps substantively there was an estoppel in Womack
v. Grandbush, but it is difficult to see since all relevent facts con-
cerning the other partner were developed during the original trial.
6. REMEDIES
(a) Rescission and restitution for fraud in the inducement.
Rescission was held to be the proper remedy in Dumas v.
Klatt,'2 7 although the court had to award a decree for payment of
money, instead of restoring the specific property which the de-
fendant, the delinquent party, had received from the plaintiffs. In
this case, the plaintiff bought a duplex from the defendant who
38 Id. at 452, 296 P.2d at 1043.
" Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann § 13-7-23 (1953).
= 133 Colo. 451, 296 P.2d at 1043.
21298 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1956).
Colo. R. Civ. Proc. 106 (a) (5).
'Cf. Grandbush v. Wornack, 129 Colo. 26, 266 (P.2d 771 (1954) (cited in instant case).
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 76-1-1 (1953) (joint and several obligations).
ssColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 104-1-15 (2) (1953).
Id. §§ 104-1-13 & 14.
132 Colo. 333, 288 P.2d 642 (1955).
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knowingly misrepresented material facts concerning the duplex
with the intent of inducing the purchase by plaintiff. Plaintiff did
reasonably rely on these misrepresentations, as was to have been
expected. Plaintiff tendered the duplex back to the defendant, but
to preserve it, and avoid increased damages, continued to rent it
pending outcome of the action. The court restored the status quo,
insofar as possible, by decreeing that the defendant pay the plain-
tiff the purchase price, plus expenses of operating the duplex, less
rentals received by the plaintiff.
Note: The Supreme Court spoke of fraud in the "inception"
without defining it as fraud in the procurement, in which event the
transaction would be void (but restitution would still be proper)
and fraud in the inducement, which it was, in which event the
agreement is merely voidable at the instance of the injured party.
When the agreement is voidable, the injured party may elect to
affirm and seek damages or may rescind and seek restitution. 8
(b) Damages for fraud in the inducement.
A judgment for damages (in the form of cancellation of pur-
chase money notes) in Cherrington v. Woods, 29 was reversed. Here,
the plaintiff purchased a tavern from the defendant, under a con-
tract which provided: "It is understood that the books and records
of said business will be open and available for Mr. Wood's inspec-
tion. . . ."0 A year after the purchase plaintiff claimed he was de-
2 5 Williston, Contracts 9 1488 (Rev. ed. 1937). Restatement, Contracts § 475, comments (a) &
(b) (1932). .S132 Colo. 500, 290 P.2d 226 (1955)
o Id. at 503, 290 P.2d at 227.
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frauded in that the business showed a net profit which was much
less than the $1,400.00 to $1,600.00 per month claimed to have been
represented by the seller. The Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment, dismissed the complaint and ordered further proceedings on
the counterclaim on the notes given by plaintiff for the unpaid
balance of the purchase price. The reason given being:
"Where the means of knowledge are at hand and equally avail-
able to both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike open
to their inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of
these means and opportunities, he will not be heard to say
that he has been deceived by the vendor's representations.",'
(c) Rescission for breach of warranty in contract of sale.
Rudd v. Rogerson"2 is an action which construes Uniform Sales
Act,8 3 dealing with rescission as a remedy for breach of an express
warranty in a sale. In this instance, plaintiff sought to rescind the
purchase of cattle, which were expressly warranted, prior to the
sale, in the bill of sale, and even after delivery, to be registered, or
registerable, Aberdeen Angus cattle. The defendant argued that
the plaintiff, by inspection of the cattle and the herd book, which
was in plaintiff's hands for a week (but which defendant himself
represented as needing additional entries to constitute a complete
record) knew or could have discovered the incorrectness of the
warranty. Plaintiff showed that he did not rely on the herd book,
but on the representations of defendant. In reversing a judgment on
a counter claim for balance due on the purchase price, and rein-
stating the plaintiff's complaint, our Supreme Court held:
(1) The defendant sold the cattle under an express warranty
as defined in the above statute.
(2) Where an expressed warranty is given, the buyer is not
precluded from relying on it, unless his investigation reveals the
defect. The court said that the maxim, caveat emptor, has no ap-
plication to matters included in an express warranty.
Comment: The two cases are probably consistent because in
Cherrington the statements were mere representations and in Rudd
the Court found an express warranty.
7. DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTURAL DuTy BY:
(a) Performance
Erickson v. Publix Cab Co." Plaintiff's testatrix was injured
when defendant's taxi cab backed into testatrix in a public high-
way. Testatrix had been a fare-paying passenger in the taxi. The
taxi cab driver parked the cab at the testatrix's destination, as-
sisted testatrix to the sidewalk, received his fare and returned to the
cab. Testatrix started to cross the street behind the cab, and the
cab in backing up struck testatrix. Shortly after the accident, testa-
trix died. Plaintiff sues, not in tort, but on the implied contract for
safe carriage between a carrier and its passenger, alleging that test-
atrix was still a passenger at the time of the accident. The trial
31 Id. at 506, 290 P.2d at 228.
3' 133 Colo. 506, 297 P.2d 533 (1956).
mColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 121-1-12 (1953).
" 301 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1956).
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court sustained a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the de-
fendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court,
for the reason that the contract between a carrier and passenger
terminates at such time as the carrier has discharged the passenger
in a safe place (which in this instance was the public sidewalk).
Thereafter, the testatrix was a member of the general public and
defendant owed her the same duty that it owed to all other per-
sons on the street or sidewalk. This duty was no part of the con-
tract for safe carriage.
Note: The reason for the unique theory of plaintiff is that if the
claim were based on negligence it would be an action to recover for
injuries done to the person, which does not survive under the
statute.3 5
(b) Release and mutual rescission.
In Johnston v.Emerson3 6 the plaintiff contracted with defend-
ant to remodel a certain structure. Disputes arose and the parties
entered into a release and rescission agreement under which de-
fendant warranted and guaranteed that all work already executed
under the agreement would be sound and waterproof, free from de-
fects of materials and workmanship for a period of one year from
August 18, 1949. In an action for damages filed in 1951, but tried
in 1955, experts testified as to defects in work done prior to the
date of the release and rescission, and not within the terms of the
guarantee. In holding that the judgment in favor of plaintiff should
be reversed and the complaint dismissed, the Supreme Court ruled:
85 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-9 (1953).
133 Colo. 343, 296 P.2d 229 (1956).
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(1) The rescission agreement relieved defendant of the obliga-
tions of the original contract;
(2) The release agreement was to be construed against its
makers, plaintiffs, and
(3) Duties, if any, of defendants were to be measured as of the
one year guarantee period, and not by conditions five years later.
(c) Surrender of Promissary Note to its makers:
Two of the defendants in Denver National Bank v. McLagan,
7
defended an action by the bank, special administrator, of the estate
of Margaret Hurley, deceased, on $7,000.00 in notes executed by de-
fendants, on the ground that the decedent had returned the notes
to the makers with the statement, "I want thee and John to have
these.38 As to another claim concerning a later loan of $2,000.00,
defendants contended this also to have been a gift. They had been
paying interest on it and when the $2,000.00 was delivered one de-
fendant indicated that John could use it at six per cent. The Su-
preme Court affirmed that part of the judgment which found that
the notes were the subject of a gift to the makers, but reversed
as to the $2,000.00 with instructions to enter judgment for this
amount. The reasons were:
(1) Voluntary surrender of a promissary note by the named
payee to the maker will operate in and of itself as a gift and ex-
tinguishment of the debt and in such case it is not necessary to the
validity of the gift that the note shown be endorsed by the payee.
(2) Lack of a note for the $2,000.00 does not evidence an intent
to make a gift, and payment of interest negatives donative intent.
(d) Substantial failure of consideration.
Scientific Packages, Inc. v. Gwinn.'9 On March 16, 1953, de-
fendant Gwinn gave Shapiro a written 10 day option to buy
Gwinn's interest in Scientific Products, Inc. (hereafter called Sci-
entific). Shapiro exercised the option by making certain payments
and promising to have Scientific, within 10 days, secure a release
from the First National Bank of Denver, releasing Gwinn from all
obligation as a guarantor of a third person's note. Gwinn agreed
that neither he nor any corporation "now" controlled by him would
compete with Scientific, directly or indirectly, for five years, in
= 133 Colo. 487, 298 P.2d 386 (1956).
's Id. at 492, 298 P.2d at 388.
S301 P.2d 719 (Colo. 1956).
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the United States. Time was expressly made of the essence. Sha-
piro, without justification, failed to secure the required release
from the bank, and Gwinn had to purchase the note for $10,000.00.
In September, 1953, a corporation called Die-Craft Corpora-
tion was organized. Gwinn became a stockholder in this corpora-
tion, and in April, 1954, it started to compete with Scientific.
Scientific, Shapiro and others, seek to enjoin Gwinn and Die-Craft
Corporation from competing. When the application for a temporary
injunction was denied by the trial court, a writ of error was
prosecuted to review the denial.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the injunction
stating:
(1) Failure to release Gwinn from liability on the note held
by the Bank in accordance with Shapiro's promise was a substan-
tial breach of the contract, which deprived plaintiffs of the right
to demand performance by Gwinn of the agreement not to operate
a competing business. The party who commits the first substantial
breach of a non-divisible contract is also deprived of the right to
complain of a subsequent breach by the other party.
(2) Neither corporation was party to the contract between
Gwinn and Shapiro. Gwinn could not compel Scientific to secure
the release, and Gwinn did not waive the duty of Shapiro to secure
the release.
(3) Die-Craft Corporation was not a corporation, "now" con-
trolled by Gwinn, within the meaning of the March 16, 1953, option
contract.Note: Scientific was a third party donee beneficiary; Gwinn's
duty not to compete was dependent on the release, and the donee's
rights were likewise dependent (conditional).
8. ILLEGAL BARGAINS
(a) Restraint of Trade
A restraint on competition was found to be enforcible and rea-
sonable in the case reported as Mabray v. Williams.4 0 The plaintiff
had hired the defendant as an associate physician under terms of a
written contract which restricted Dr. Mabray, upon termination of
association with plaintiff, from practicing medicine for five years,
in a radius of fifty miles of Lamar, Colorado, without written per-
mission of Dr. Williams. When the contract terminated, Dr. Mabray,
without such permission continued to practice in Lamar. Dr. Wil-
liams secured an injunction and the Supreme Court affirmed the
decree on the basis of Freudenthal v. Espey,' 1 a case which also
involved physicians, quoting: "The reasonable and fair protection
to which the plaintiff is entitled can only be obtained by the
parties conforming expressly and exactly to the terms of the
contract."
4 2
Query: Should not public policy, in view of the shortage of
doctors, have confined plaintiff to a claim for damages?
4o 132 Colo. 523, 291 P.2d 677 (1955).
'45 Colo. 488, 102 Pac. 280 (1909) (cited in instant case).
2 Id. at 506, 102 Pac. at 286.
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(b) Severability and enforceability of legal portion of contract.
If the legal portion of a contract is severable from an illegal
portion, the courts will enforce the portion to which no illegality
attaches. In Carter v. Thompkins,43 the plaintiff contracted to fur-
nish and install plumbing fixtures, a furnace, stoker, ducts, etc.
The statute44 requires a license to install plumbing fixtures. No
such license is required as to the furnace, stoker, ducts, etc., nor
to sell plumbing fixtures. From a summary judgment dismissing
the complaint when it appeared that plaintiff lacked the statutory
license, plaintiff appealed and in reversing the summary judgment
and remanding for further action it was held:
(1) Contracts for services by one who is required by statute
to have a license to engage in the particular profession, trade or
calling, and who does not have such a license are generally unen-
forcable.
(2) This contract is severable and therefore enforceable as to
all amounts due, except for installing plumbing fixtures.
(3) If plumbing fixtures were installed by a licensed plumber,
on behalf of plaintiff, that plumber could, in his own name, sue for
installation services.
9. QUANTUM MERUIT RECOVERY FOR VALUE OF MATERIAL DELIVERED
AND LABOR PERFORMED
Leoffer v. Wilcox45 presents the unique situation of a suit by a
well driller's administratrix for the reasonable value of materials
and labor in drilling a well for defendants. During lifetime of the
driller the defendants had secured a substantial rebate of monies
paid the driller by representing that they were dissatisfied with the
well drilled, since it only produced 200 gallons per minute, instead
of the guaranteed 1000 gallons per minute. But while leading the
driller to believe the well was useless for irrigation, the defendants
were arranging to and did use it to irrigate 100 acres of land. In
affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court reasoned:
(1) The refund and rescission agreement "was predicated upon
a mistake of fact if the testimony is considered in its most favor-
able light in behalf of defendants, or as a result of the fraudulent
representation taken at its worst .... 41
(2) As stated in Louthan v. Carson,47 "... where a thing is so
far perfected as to answer the intended purpose, and it is taken pos-
session of and turned to that purpose, by the party for whom it was
constructed, no mere imperfection or omission, which does not vir-
tually affect its usefulness, can be interposed to prevent a recovery,
subject to a deduction for damages, consequent upon the imperfec-
tion complained of."
48
(Note: On the court's reasoning, recovery cannot clearly be de-
termined as either contract or quantum meruit, and is here treated
as the latter.)
"133 Colo. 279, 294 P.2d 265 (1956).
"Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. J 107-1-9 (1953).
"132 Colo. 449, 289 P.2d 902 (1955).
"Id. at 452, 289 P.2d at 904.
'T63 Colo. 473, 168 Pac. 656 (1919) (cited in instant case).
'" Id. at 477, 168 Pac. at 658.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CRIMINAL LAW
By MELVIN ROSSMAN
Attended Denver Public Schools and North Denver High School; B.A. de-
gree 1942, Yeshiva College, New York City; Law School, University of
Denver, graduated 1947; Deputy District Attorney since January, 1949;
Instructor of Criminal Law at Denver Police Academy; taught bar re-
fresher course in criminal law at both Denver and Colorado universities.
The cases which form the content of this review are those
which were decided between September of 1955, and January of
1957.
Since the publication of the last yearly review, several cases
have been presented for appeal in which the Supreme Court has
again admonished counsel that the status of the record on appeal
must meet the test in all cases. In McConnell v. People,' Justice
Knauss said:
"Writs of error in criminal cases are governed by the rules
pertinent to such cases. It is incumbent on counsel for a de-
fendant in a criminal case to file in this Court of an Abstract
of Record and an assignment of errors relied upon for re-
versal.
12
In its latest pronouncement on the subject, the court, in Rochon
v. People,3 noted that there had been no compliance whatever with
the requirement of the rules governing the practice in criminal
cases and said, "Again we say that the Rules of Civil Procedure do
not apply in criminal cases."
4
In the case of People v. Read,- the court was confronted with
an appeal by the State in a case where the justice court had grant-
ed a motion to quash a complaint on the ground that the State had
failed to file an information or a true bill returned by a grand jury.
In that case the court held that writs of error shall lie on the
State's behalf to review proceedings before a justice of the peace,
there being no limitation confining the operation of the statute re-
lating to writs of error to courts of record.
In Peterson v. People,6 the Supreme Court held that before
error can be charged to a trial court it must have been afforded
opportunity to commit the charged error with a like opportunity
for correction thereof, and a motion for a new trial which is based
on the general objection that the verdict of guilty was not sup-
ported by the evidence, was contrary to the evidence, and was not
supported by law applicable to the offense charged, did not proper-
ly or specifically direct attention of the trial court to any specific
error and therefore there was no basis for finding error in the
trial court's denial of such motion.
In Hardy v. People,' the court held that where an amended
and supplemental motion for a new trial following a conviction of
1 132 Colo. 295, 287 P.2d 659 (1955).
Id. at 296, 827 P.2d at 660.
89 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 123 (Jan. 14, 1957).
'Id. at 124.
132 Colo. 390, 288 P,2d 347 (1955).
8 133 Colo. 516, 297 P.2d 529 (1956).
*132 Colo. 201, 292 P.2d 973 (1956).
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murder was made after the term of court had ended, the court
was without jurisdiction to entertain such a motion.
Although the Supreme Court did rule on the merits of the
case based upon the assignments of error presented in the case
of Graham v. People,8 Justice Moore in a specially concurring
opinion questioned the right of the court to decide the case, stating:
"I sincerely believe that we embark upon an unchartered course
when we take jurisdiction of this case under these circumstances.""
The circumstances to which he referred were- that the defendant
had not authorized any proceedings in the Supreme Court to re-
view the conviction, that the record conclusively showed that he
had protested the action of counsel in causing the writ of error to
issue, and had on two separate occasions demanded in writing that
the proceedings in the Supreme Court be stopped and that the
judgment of the district court be permitted to stand. In view of
these circumstances, Justice Moore concluded that the writ of error
should be dismissed. It should be noted that in all of the afore-
mentioned decisions, the court was considering matters entirely
procedural in nature. Further decisions or parts of decisions re-
lating to purely procedural matters were the following:
In People v .Read, referred to above, the court held that prose-
cution of cases before a justice of the peace need not be had on in-
formation filed by a district attorney, or by a grand jury indict-
8 302 P.2d 737 (1956).
. Id. at 749.
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ment, but it may be prosecuted on warrant issued on oath or
verified complaint of any competent person, and that the complaint
need not contain a statement that one signing it on oath is a com-
petent witness or has personal knowledge of the facts charged.
In Cooper v. People,1° the Supreme Court ruled that it was
error to fail to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of not
guilty for the purpose of permitting argument on a motion to
quash a grand jury indictment on the ground of duplicity inas-
much as the only way of presenting the question of duplicity is by
motion to quash, which must be made before trial, and the failure
of the court to permit the withdrawal of the plea, under the facts
of this case, constituted an abuse of discretion.
In the case of Brown v. People," after the jury had been se-
lected and sworn in a murder trial, the judge learned that the
clerk had intentionally concealed the ticket bearing the name of a
juror on the panel so that his name would not and could not be
drawn, whereupon, the court, on its own motion, declared a mis-
trial and discharged the jury. The defendant, in a subsequent
habeas corpus proceeding, contended that the court was not legally
justified in declaring a mistrial, and since the jury had already
been selected and sworn, he had been placed in double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court held the action of the trial court to be le-
gally justified, stating: "When any irregularity worthy of notice
and capable of correction appears, a declaration of mistrial is le-
gally justified."'"
The court further stated:
"A court of justice is invested with the authority to discharge
a jury from giving any verdict whenever in the Court's opinion
there is manifest necessity for such act or the ends of public
justice would otherwise be defeated, and that such is within
the discretion of the trial court and is not subject to review in
the absence of abuse of discretion .... The fact that a juror was
withdrawn is not of itself sufficient to indicate jeopardy, since
a court of review will not presume an abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court.""
Procedural matters dealing with the withdrawals of pleas have
also again come to the attention of the Supreme Court. In Matz v.
People,14 the defendant, charged with burglary and conspiracy,
wanted to withdraw a plea of not guilty and enter a plea to the
charges. The district attorney filed a written motion to dismiss the
charges on the ground that the defendant had been filed on in an-
other action based upon the same facts and -that the new informa-
tion contained additional counts (habitual criminal), not charged
in the first information. Defendant objected to the dismissal, which
the trial court permitted.
'o 132 Colo. 548, 291 P.2d 388 (1955).
132 Colo. 561, 291 P.2d 680 (1955).
Id. at 569, 291 P.2d at 684.
'8 Id. at 568, 291 P.2d at 682.
14 133 Colo. 45, 291 P.2d 1059 (1956).
SACHS-LAWULOR -CORPORATION SEALS- ALPInE 5-3422
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In Meier v. People,6 the defendant entered a plea of nolo con-
tendere to the charge of involuntary manslaughter. When it became
apparent that the court was not inclined to grant probation, she
asked leave to withdraw her plea of nolo contendere and again
enter a plea of not guilty. This was refused and she was subsequent-
ly sentenced.
In both cases the Supreme Court held the principle to be the
same, that an application to change a plea is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, that its ruling will be reversed only
for an abuse of discretion, and that there had not been an abuse of
discretion in either case. In the Matz case the court further held
that the defendant could not possibly suffer prejudice by judgment
of dismissal. The fact that the indirect result might be the filing of
the same information plus habitual criminal counts does not alter
the situation. The statute16 does not mean that the court is com-
pelled to accept a plea of guilty when made or offered. In the Meier
case the court further held that whether probation shall be granted
is a matter that rests exclusively in the discretion of the trial court,
that the Supreme Court will not order probation in any case in
which it has been denied by the trial court, and that the order of
the trial court granting or denying probation is no part of the
judgment to which a writ of error may be directed.
In Martinez v. People,'7 a murder case, on appeal counsel ad-
16 133 Colo. 338, 296 P.2d 232 (1956).
18 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-7-8 (1953).
17 299 P.2d 510 (1956).
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vanced an argument that an adequate representation of an accused
in a murder case requires the entry of a plea of "no;, guilty by rea-
son of insanity." The Supreme Court said that this argument was
without merit, and that they were not advised of any case in any
jurisdiction which was authority for that proposition.
The aforesaid cases, although decided primarily on the ques-
tion of withdrawal of pleas, were also indirectly concerned with
the matter of punishment. Some additional cases were appealed in
which the matter of punishment imposed was attacked. In the case
of Smalley v. People,18 the defendant was serving a life sentence in
the penitentiary as an habitual criminal. One of the counts under
which he had been convicted was based on a sentence to the state
reformatory when he was nineteen years old and for a first offense.
The court considered the statutes involved,19 the section of the Con-
stitution which reads as follows:
"The term felony, wherever it may occur in this Constitution,
or the laws of this State, shall be construed to mean any criminal
offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary,
and none other."2 In a four to three decision, the court held that a
"felony" under our constitution is based upon the place of confine-
ment, and the test by which an offense is determined as to whether
it is a felony or not, is by the punishment prescribed, and that this
reformatory sentence does not suffice for a felony conviction.
In a specially concurring opinion, 21 Justice Moore wrote:
"Under the constitution definition a 'criminal offense' cannot
be classed as a felony unless the person convicted thereof could
be lawfully sentenced to the penitentiary. The law does not
punish 'offenses.' It punishes individuals who commit of-
fenses .... 22
In Rochon v. People, above mentioned, the court held that a
sentence of eight to fifteen years for a conviction of aggravated
robbery was not too harsh inasmuch as a sentence of up to life
could have been imposed. In Serra v. Cameron,23 where the muni-
S 304 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1957).
"Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §J 39-10-1, 39-13-1 (1953).
2 Colo. Const., Art. XVIII, § 4 (1876).
219 Colo. Bar. Ass'n Ady. Sh. 100.
22 Id. at 101.
= 133 Colo. 115, 292 P.2d 340 (1956).
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cipal court had convicted the defendant and suspended sentence
and therafter vacated suspension, the defendant's imprisonment
under the sentence was held lawful irrespective of whether the
municipal court had authority to suspend the original sentence.
In Bustamante v. People, 4 the defendant was convicted of con-
verting public funds. The statute25 provides for imprisonment for
not less than five years. It does not expressly state that the impris-
onment shall be in the penitentiary. The court held that imprison-
ment in the penitentiary is unlawful unless expressly so provided
in the statute. Doubtless, under the rule laid down in Brooks v.
People26 the offense, although providing for a minimum sentence
of five years, is but a misdemeanor.
Three of the aforementioned cases were also concerned with
matters relating to juries and jurors. In the Bustamante case the
trial court sustained the prosecution's challenge for cause, after all
peremptory challenges had been exhausted, on the ground that the
juror's wife's sister was married to a person who might be called
as a witness and that the same juror's employer was bondsman for
the defendant. The Supreme Court, in reversing the case, held that
sustaining the challenge was an abuse of discretion which affected
the substantial rights of the defendant, and inasmuch as the voir
dire examination disclosed no statutory ground 7 for challenge for
cause, amounted to giving the State an additional peremptory chal-
lenge.
In the Graham case, one of the points raised was that the de-
fendant had filed a motion to waive a jury and be tried by the
court, which motion was denied. The court held that the motion
was properly denied; that in a trial for murder the mandatory pro-
visions of the statute 8 require a jury to fix the degree of murder,
and if determined to be murder of the first degree, to fix the pen-
alty to be suffered by the defendant and the trial judge has no
duty other than to impose a sentence in accordance with the
verdict.
In the Brown case the Supreme Court upheld the finding of
the trial court that the name of a juror having been surreptitiously
removed from the box, the panel was thus corrupted, and that such
an act constituted legal justification for discharging the jury and
declaring a mistrial.
The question of venue was raised in two cases:
In the Graham case, after quoting the statute relating to cases
where injury is inflicted in one county and the injured party dies
in another county,2 9 the Supreme Court held that the "cause of
death" was administered in the City and County of Denver, when
the defendant caused the bomb to be placed in the airplane and out
of his custody and beyond his control with the intent and for the
purpose of causing the death of his mother, a passenger. Her death
was the result of the defendant's unlawful act, and this unlawful
24 133 Colo. 497, 297 P.2d 538 (1956).
2Colo. Rev.'Stat. Ann. J 40-19-3 (1953).
20 14 Colo. 413 (1890).
' See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 78-1-1 to 9 (1953).
Id. § 40-2-3.
- Id. § 40-2-12.
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act having occurred in the City and County of Denver, the venue
was properly laid in that county.
In Abeyta v. People," the testimony as to venue, though slight,
was not contradicted. The defendants didn't offer evidence regard-
ing the venue nor did they tender an instruction on the subject.
The court held that where the evidence as to venue, even though
slight, is not contradicted, the jury may find that the alleged crime
was committed in the county where the trial took place, and there
is sufficient proof of venue to justify denial of a motion for a di-
rected verdict of not guilty on that ground.
Questions dealing with the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination were considered in two recent cases:
In People v. Schneider"' the defendants were indicted by a
grand jury for malfeasance. Before the jury returned the indict-
ments the defendants were subpoenaed before the grand jury and
compelled to testify without being advised of their constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court, in affirm-
ing the trial court's action in granting the motion to quash the in-
dictment, held that courts have a duty to quash an indictment
based upon testimony which violates a defendant's constitutional
guarantee against self-incrimination. The court quoted from a
Missouri case:
"It is intolerable that one whose conduct is being investigated
for the purpose of fixing on him a criminal charge should, in
view of our constitutional mandate, be summoned to testify
against himself, and furnish evidence upon which he may be
indicted. It is a plain violation both of the letter and spirit of
our organic law.
32
Vigil v. People,3 3 was the other case in which the question of
self-incrimination was brought up. During the trial, the complain-
ing witness was permitted to place a mask on the defendant's face
so that she could positively identify him in the same manner he
appeared on the night of the alleged robbery. Defendant objected
on the ground that this violated the constitutional provision against
o 9 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 124 (Jan. 14, 1957).
31 133 Colo. 173, 292 P.2d 982 (1956).
"State .Y Faulkner, 175 Mo. 546, 75 S.W. 116 (1903).




self-incrimination. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court say-
ing that the provision against self-incrimination is limited to pro-
tection against testimonial compulsion and does not extend to the
exclusion of the body as evidence when such evidence may be
relevant and material. Our constitution. protects one against an
admission of guilt coming from his own lips under compulsion and
against the will of the accused and has no relation whatever to
real as distinguished from testimonial evidence.
The balance of this review will refer to decisions in which the
court was confronted with assignments of error pertaining to evi-
dence and instructions.
In three homicide cases the court again reaffirmed the gen-
eral rule followed in Colorado that if there is any evidence, how-
ever slight and however improbable, which could conceivably re-
duce a homicide to manslaughter, the defendant is entitled to an
instruction thereon.
3 4
In Medina v. People," the court held that it is always com-
petent to present evidence to challenge the credibility of an ad-
verse witness by proof of independent facts and circumstances
with his or her testimony even though such evidence may show
the commission of another act or acts which might amount to a
Armijo v. People, 304 P.2d 633 (1956); Hardy v. People, 132 Colo. 201, 292 P.2d 973 (1956);
Becksted v. People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956).
35 133 Colo. 67, 291 P.2d 1061 (1956).




/ FUND you can acquire an owner-
ship interest in a diversified group of carefully selected corporations.
FOUNDERS MUTUAL FUND offers systematic investment plans as
low as $20 initially and $10 periodically.
For Prospectus fill in and return this advertisement to:
Founders Mutual Depositor Corp.
1130 First National Bank Bldg.
AComa 2-2818
Donver 1. Colorado
Name Address ------ ... .. .
City -. . - _______ ~State-... . ......._(D_
DICTA
Mar.-Apr., 1957
crime. In the same case it was further held that our statute ,3
while requiring proof of a specific intent to do bodily harm to the
person assaulted, does not relieve a defendant of responsibility for
the consequences of his unlawful act because the victim is other
than the person he intended to harm. This is an application of the
doctrine of transferred intent.
In Becksted v. People,37 it was again held that a defendant in
a first degree murder case has the right, without reference to a
plea of insanity, to establish mental deficiency to form the specific
intent essential to first degree murder. It was error to refuse
to allow the testimony of a psychiatrist, not for the purpose of
showing insanity, but as to the ability of the defendant to form the
specific intent to kill. It was also held in this case that the affirm-
ative defense of insanity must be treated as a criminal matter and
the burden is on the State to prove sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In Trujillo v. People,"' the defendant was convicted of involun-
tary manslaughter. In reversing the conviction, the court stated:
"Ordinary or simple negligence is not sufficient to sustain a
charge of involuntary manslaughter. We see no difference in
the degree of negligence required to sustain a charge of man-
slaughter and that necessary to support a verdict in favor of
a claimant in an action for damages under the guest statute.
In each instance, the essential ingredient is a wanton and wil-
ful disregard of the rights and safety of others.
'"3 9
In Lutz v. People,'46 the defendant in a murder case offered
testimony of good character some four or five years prior to the
event which was basis of the charge. In upholding the trial court's
rejection of such evidence as having no probative value, the Su-
preme Court said:
"A defendant in a criminal prosecution may introduce evi-
dence of his good character and reputation provided such tes-
timony is confined to the particular traits involved in the
offense charged, and is not too remote. The limit of time which
would make -such evidence too remote, hence inadmissable,
cannot be fixed definitely and each case must of necessity de-
pend on its own facts and circumstances, the matter resting in
the sound judicial discretion of the trial court."
41
In the same case it was held that no error is committed if a
trial court refuses to give a requested instruction but covers the
subject matter of the refused instruction by one which is submit-
ted to the jury.
In considering the question of implied malice, the court said:
"Implied malice must of necessity be established by all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the crime. The perpetra-
tor may testify as to his state of mind and heart at the time of
the homicide, but the jury can do no other than to resolve the
SColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-34 (1953).
133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956).
' 133 Colo. 186, 292 P.2d 980 (1956).
" Id at 189, 292 P.2d at 982.
o 133 Colo. 229, 293 P.2d 646 (1956).
41 Id. at 233, 293 P.2d at 649.
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matter of implied malice from the attendant facts and circum-
stances. Implied malice cannot be established as readily as a
date on a calendar or the color of the clothing worn by the de-
ceased at the time she met her death.
'4 2
In the Graham case, the court. again held that oral and writ-
ten confessions are direct evidence justifying the submission of a
first degree murder instruction and that where a confession is
admissable, it is admissable as an entire statement including that
which is favorable as well as unfavorable to the party making it
even though it may admit his participation in crimes other than
that charged in the information.
In Romero v. People," it was held that ownership in larceny
cases may be laid either in the real owner or in the person in
whose possession the property was at the time of the theft.
In Self v. People,44 an extradition proceeding based on a parole
violation in the demanding state, it was held that the guilt or
innocence of the alleged fugitive may not be considered in ex-
tradition matters. Thus, where the record discloses duly authenti-
cated documents showing that the accused is on parole, and be-
cause of some act has violated the conditions thereof, and parole
authorities have revoked his parole and demanded his return, he
is a fugitive from justice, and it is not only within the power of
the governor of the asylum state to issue a warrant for his ex-
tradition, but his duty to do so.
In Armijo v. People," it was held that other offenses may be
shown in evidence when they are so interwoven with the principal
transaction that it is necessary to show them in order to give a
fair and true understanding of the offense which is charged.
And again, with reference to the question of implied malice,
the following instruction was given and approved, and will no
doubt become a stock instruction in future cases of the same
type:
"If a sane person, without legal justification or excuse inten-
tionally uses a deadly weapon upon the person of another at
a vital part, and inflicts a mortal wound, under circumstances
showing no considerable provocation, then intent to kill may
be presumed or implied as an inference of fact from the act
itself. .. .. ". 4
In the same case the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
refusal to give an instruction on absence of motive since it is not
necessary to prove a motive as an essential element in the crime
of murder.
Finally, it should be noted that no less than twelve cases de-
cided during the period covered by this review had one or more
assignments of error based upon an alleged abuse of discretion by
the trial court. The Supreme Court has refused, and undoubtedly
will continue to refuse, to consider them as subject to review in the
absence of a clear abuse of discretion.
42 Id. at 236, 293 P.2d at 650.
43304 P.2d 639 (1956).
4 133 Colo. 524, 297 P.2d 887 (1956).
"304 P.2d 633 (1956).
S6 Id. at 637.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By HOMER H. CLARK, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
The past year' was not an active one in Colorado for domestic
relations law. The only cases of striking interest to the practitioner
in this field concern the law of delinquency and adoption.
A broader view of the year's developments in the national law
of marriage and the family can be obtained from a recent excellent
article which should be of value to Colorado lawyers and judges.*-'
MARRIAGE
The only case involving marriage reiterated the Supreme
Court's position that the capacity of persons to marry, at least so
far as age is concerned, is governed by the law of the place where
the marriage is contracted. In Spencer v. People' the court held
that a marriage contracted in Utah between persons domiciled in
Colorado was valid even though the girl was only fifteen years old,
where the Utah statute fixed the age of consent to marry at four-
teen for the female. The court relied on the Colorado statute which
provides that marriages contracted outside the state are valid if
valid by the law of the place where contracted.
4
DIVORCE, ALIMONY AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
Questions of divorce procedure and defenses were dealt with
in Collins v. Collins.' The plaintiff-wife brought a first divorce ac-
tion in 1951, based on cruelty, and in April, 1953 her complaint was
dismissed after a jury verdict found that both spouses had been
guilty of cruelty. In May of 1953 the wife brought another divorce
action based on general allegations of cruelty and at the trial gave
evidence of cruelty occurring after the filing of the first suit but
before that suit was tried. The Supreme Court directed dismissal
of the suit. The opinion leaves doubt about the court's reasoning,
In compliance with the editor's request, the author has included only cases decided during the
period from November 1, 1955 to December 31, 1956.
,See Johnston, Family Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 335 (1951).
. 133 Colo. 196, 292 P.2d 971 (1956).
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 90-1-5 (1953). See also Payne v. Payne, 121 Colo. 212, 214 P.2 495
(1950). Marriages of persons under sixteen are void by Colorado low. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
* 90-1-4 (1953).
5 132 Colo. 495, 289 P.2d 900 (1955,.
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but apparently the judgment rests on two grounds: (a) The prior
action was a conclusive adjudication of the wife's own fault, so that
she was barred by recrimination. (b) The wife could not in this
action rely on acts of cruelty occurring before the trial of the prior
action. The first of these grounds is certainly valid. The second is
also proper as a means of discouraging repeated, harrassing suits
but it seems inconsistent with the language in Harms v. Harms.'
The Harms case held that it was reversible error to admit testi-
mony of acts of cruelty occurring after filing of the suit but before
trial. The court in Collins stated:
"The evidence in the first divorce action was not necessarily
limited to matters occurring prior to the date of the filing of
the complaint, but evidence of other facts, whether before
or after suit, which serve to give character to the acts of cruelty
alleged and proven, is admissible. This is true whether or not
plaintiff filed an amended complaint to embrace matters oc-
curring after the suit was commenced as she had a right to do
under our rules."
This might overrule sub silentio the court's statement in Harms
that "we do determine that defendant herein was bound by, and
should have been confined to, his bill of particulars filed herein on
motion and order during the process of arriving at issue in the
case. ' ' 8 Perhaps the rule of the Harms case only applies where a
bill of particulars has been filed and not where the parties rely
solely on the complaint to outline the issues.
The relationship between divorce and bankruptcy was involved
in one case, Todd v. Todd.' The Supreme Court held that where the
husband became a bankrupt before a final division of property in
the divorce action, the district court in the divorce case had juris-
diction to determine the interests of the spouses, and of the hus-
band's trustee in bankruptcy, to property standing in the joint
names of husband and wife.
A rather difficult question of the division of property on di-
vorce was raised by Lee v. Lee.10 During a large part of the parties'
marital life the husband loaned nearly all of his earnings to his
mother who used the money to pay off a loan on a valuable piece
of real estate. During this time the wife contributed her own funds
for the support of the family. The husband's mother died before the
divorce action was brought leaving the real estate to the husband.
The Supreme Court, stating that there would have been no inherit-
ance had it not been for the wife's contributions to the family,
directed that the inheritance should be taken into account in mak-
ing an allowance of propery to the wife. The case reaches what
appears to be an equitable result, but it never examines closely the
a 120 Colo. 212, 209 P.2d 552 (1949).
, 132 Colo. at 499, 289 P.2d at 90.
0 120 Colo. at 217, 209 P.2d at 554.
9 133 Colo. 1. 291 P.2d 386 (1956). On the general question of bankruptcy and family low, see
Joslin, Bankruptcy from a Family Law Perspective, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 789 (1956).
1 133 Colo. 128, 293 P.2d 293 (1956).
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purposes of awards of money in divorce. If the purpose of this
award was merely to divide the property of the parties, then clearly
the wife should not share in an inheritance received by the hus-
band. If the purpose was to reward the wife for years of faithful
support of the family, then she should share in any property owned
by the husband, no matter how acquired. This latter purpose is
one usually held relevant to alimony, not to a property division.1'
Although the exact label placed on the award did not matter in the
Lee case, it sometimes is extremely important. Therefore, it is
submitted that the courts ought to be more articulate about just
what kind of an award they are making to the wife in a case like
t1ais one. Superficially, this case would seem to be overruled by the
proposed new divorce law for Colorado," but if the award to the
wife is to be considered alimony, rather than a share of property,
the new statute would not apply to it. This makes it all the more
important for the courts to be clear about what they are doing
when they begin to award the husband's property to the wife in
divorce cases.
In Stephenson v. Stephenson,1" the Supreme Court reversed an
award of property to a wife in divorce on the ground that the
husband did not own as much property as the trial, court found
belonged to him and on the ground that the award as made below
completely impoverished him. The Supreme Court held that since
the lower court's decree was made solely on the basis of documents,
it was entitled to none of the usual presumptions in favor of cor-
rectness.
One other case 14 approved dismissal of a contempt citation
against a delinquent husband on the ground that the wife had let
arrears of alimony accumulate for several years without taking any
action. During this time the husband had been available for service
of process and his whereabouts known to the wife. The Supreme
Court, after stating that the contempt remedy is to be used cauti-
ously, found that the dismissal was within the trial court's discre-
tion. Presumably if the trial court had reached the opposite con-
clusion, its decision would have been affirmed also.
uSee, e.g., Poppe v. Poppe, 114 Ind. App. 348, 52 N.E.2d 506 (1944).
'2 H. B. 70, § 5, omending Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-1-5 (2)(a) (1933). At present writing this
bill has passed both Houses of the Legislature but has not been signed by the Governor.
u8299 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1956).
14 Conway v. Conway, 299 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1956).
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The single case" in this category upheld a conveyance by a
dying man in trust to support research in lung cancer, rejecting
his wife's contention that the transfer was made in fraud of her
rights. The court stated the rule to be that a husband may convey
his property during his life to anyone he pleases, even though
the conveyance deprives his wife of her inheritance, provided that
the conveyance is bona fide and not merely colorable. The court
found that the bona fide nature of this conveyance was not af-
fected by the husband's subjecting the property to the payment of
all debts which he might contract during his lifetime.
PARENT AND CHILD
Two cases during the past year dealt with property transfers
between related persons. One of these, Shores v. Shores,16 held that
the presumption of a gift which arises when a father takes title
to land in the name of a daughter was rebutted. The court relied
on the facts that the daughter was an adult and was thus not the
beneficiary of any obligation of the father, that the father had
retained possession of the land, and that the parties had treated
similar transactions as if the father had retained ownership. On
these facts the presumption would seem to have been fully rebutted.
The other case mentioned 17 appeared to hold that there is no fiduci-
ary relationship between grandmother and granddaughter which
might create a presumption of undue influence or fraud in a trans-
fer of land from one to the other. The court affirmed the trial
judge's decision that the deeds could not be cancelled either for
alleged incompetence of the grandmother or for fraud or undue
influence.
The family car doctrine was applied in a case of relatively
slight interest, Ferguson v. Hurford.18 The defendant, mother of
the driver of the car, was shown to have taken title in her name,
registered the car in her name and taken out insurance in her
name. The court held her the owner in spite of the fact that her
son paid for the car and paid the expenses of its operation. As
owner, she was liable under the family car doctrine.
Two other unimportant cases, mentioned only for the sake of
completeness, are Hayes v. Hayes, 9 approving a decree which di-
vided custody and allowed the mother to remove her child from the
state, and Angelopoulos v. Wise,'0 which held that the evidence of
paternity in an action for contributory dependency was not clearly
sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant was the
father of the child.
Two cases involving dependency and adoption were decided
by the Supreme Court and are of considerable importance for law-
yers and judges. he first of these is Fackerell v. District Court.2
1
It arose as a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition
"s Richard v. James, 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956).
"0303 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1956).
7 Hines v. Oliver, 133 Colo. 40, 291 P.2d 693 (1955).
Is 132 Colo. 507, 290 P.2d 229 (1955).
"9303 P.2d 238 (Colo. 1956).
20 133 Colo. 133, 293 P.2d 294 (1956).
" 133 Colo. 370, 295 P.2d 682 (1956).
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against the further hearing of a habeas corpus case by the district
court for Adams county. Petitioner had obtained an adoption decree
in the Moffat county court in 1952, based upon a consent by the
child's mother. The child had been in the petitioner's custody for
about a year before the adoption decree was granted, but the opin-
ion does not state how the petitioner acquired custody. In 1955
the child's mother filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Adams
county district court alleging that the adoption decree had been
obtained by fraud and seeking custody of her child. It was this
habeas corpus suit which petitioner sought to prevent by his peti-
tion for the writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court refused the writ
of prohibition on the ground that the Moffat county court had had
no jurisdicion to grant the adoption decree. Apparently the reason
for the lack of jurisdiction was the absence of a prior relinquishment
decree.
It is not clear what the effect of the Fackerell decision will be.
The relinquishment statute does provide that no person may re-
ceive a child for purposes of adoption unless the child has been
relinquished under the statute.2" Yet the adoption statute continues
to provide, quite inconsistently, that a child may be adopted upon
the filing of the required consents. 3 The Supreme Court never
discusses this conflict in the statute. The Fackerell case thus seems
-Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-3 (1953).
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-1-9 (1953).
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to mean at least that no adoption by consent of the natural parent
can be decreed unless preceded by a relinquishment decree.
The adoption statute also provides that a decree of adoption
may be granted without consents where the. non-consenting parent
has abandoned the child.24 It seems clear that the relinquishment
statute was never intended to apply where the child had been
abandoned. The court in the Fackerell case stated that no question
of abandonment was involved, but it also seemed to make the
absolute rule that a decree of adoption without a preceding re-
linquishment is void on its face. On this point two earlier Colorado
cases are to the contrary, 25 neither of them being cited by the court.
Furthermore, the court never cites or refers to the adoption
statute which prohibits attack on adoption decrees for any reason,
jurisdictional or otherwise, more than two years after the decree.2"
It appeared that the attack in this case came nearly three years
after the adoption decree.27
Finally, the case contains a dictum that a parent cannot re-
linquish a child to an individual, 28 a point which has been raised
in the past in Colorado, and on which an attorney-general's opin-
ion has been given to the contrary.29 The applicable statute allows
the court in relinquishment to award custody of the child "to whom-
soever the court shall see fit. '2 0 One can only sum up the effect of
this case by stating that it creates doubt and confusion about the
present state of adoption laws.
The second important decision referred to is Kearney v. Blue.t
In this case a mother filed a dependency petition in the Denver
juvenile court asking for an order directing the father of her chil-
dren to support them. The Supreme Court seemed to hold that the
juvenile court had no jurisdiction over actions by a mother against
a father for support of the children. The opinion concludes with
the novel suggestion that the proper remedy is a divorce proceeding,
thus creating the impression that a wife must divorce her husband
in order to force him to support their children.
The Kearney case is the latest in a line of cases limiting the
juvenile court's jurisdiction over dependency. 2
The applicable statute defines a dependent child as one "who,
in the opinion of the court, is entitled to support or care by its
parent or parents, where it appears that the parent or parents are
24 Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-16-6 (2)(b) (1953).
W Fulton v. Martensen, 129 Colo. 125, 267 P.2d 658 (1954); Moreau v. Buchholz, 124 Colo. 302,
236 P.2d 540 (1951).
26 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-1.16 (1953): "No attempt to invalidate a final decree of adoption
by reason af any jurisdictional or procedural defect shall be received by the court, or by any court
of this state, unless regularly filed with such court within two years following the entry of the
final decree."
The court states that the adoption decree was granted on October 23, 1952, and the petition
for habeas corpus filed on July 9, 1955. 133 Colo. at 371, 295 P.2d at 683.
29 133 Colo. at 374, 295 P.2d at 684.
's Op. Att'y Gen. Colo. No. 2221-52 (January 31, 1952).
0 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-6 (1953).
n301 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1956).
m Other such cases are Foxoruber v. Hansen, 128 Colo. 511. 265 P.2d 233 (1954); Everett v.
Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Arnett v. Northern, 118 Colo. 307, 194 P.2d 909 (1948);
Snyder v. Schmoyer, 106 Colo. 290, 104 P.2d 612 (1940).
SCHS-LHWLOR- CORPORATION SEALS-ALPINE 5-3422
DICTA
Mar.-Apr., 1957
failing or refusing to support or care for said child . . . . 3 The
statutes then give jurisdiction over dependent children to the
Juvenile Court.3 4 And the provision governing decrees in depen-
dency cases authorizes the juvenile court to "make such disposi-
tion of the child by adoption, guardianship, or otherwise, as seems
best for its moral and physical welfare."3 6 It has generally been
thought that this allowed the juvenile court in a proper case to
leave the child with its parents, including in the order a provision
for support. In a later section the juvenile court is given express
authority to leave the child in its own home subject to conditions
imposed by the court.36 Thus, the result of the Kearney case runs
counter to the statutory scheme. It places an unnecessary limitation
on the remedies of a wife and mother for support of her children at
a time when most authorities agree that non-support is one of the
most serious problems of modern American family law.
DELINQUENCY
Only one recent case3 7 need be mentioned here, and that one is
interesting only for a dictum which it contains to the effect that
"a single violation of any of the acts defining deliquency is not
enough upon which delinquency can be determined. It is the repe-
tition of such acts and the frequency thereof that creates a state
of delinquency or incorrigibility. 38 This dictum confuses de-
linquency with incorrigibility. The two are not the same. The de-
linquency statute very plainly says that a single violation of law
may amount to delinquency. 9 It is true, as an earlier case held,
4 0
that a series of offenses must be proved before a child can be held
incorrigible, but these offenses need not be violations of a criminal
statute. It is unfortunate that this dictum may be used to em-
barrass juvenile and county judges in the already difficult task of
handling children who come within the delinquency statute. These
judges need all the assistance and support possible for the per-
formance of their statutory duties.
SColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-1 (1953).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-9-2 (1) (1953).
e'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-i-6 (1953).
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-9 (1953).
'Spencer v. People, 133 Colo. 196, 292 P.2d 971 (1956).
133 Colo. at 199, 292 P.2d at 972.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-8-1 (2) (1953).
40 Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 Pac. 718 (1928).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
By MARGARET R. BATES
A.B., University of Denver, 1940; LL.B., Westminster Law School, 1943;
member of firm of Yegge, Bates, Hall and Shulenburg; member of
Denver, Colorado and American Bar Associations.
Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court which became final
in the period November 1, 1955 to January 1, 1957 are covered by
this review. Only one case was one of first impression under Colo-
rado law, in which the Supreme Court considered a conflict of
authority and adopted the majority rule. In all the other cases, the
court applied principles already established in Colorado tort law.
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM BLASTING
In the case of Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman,1 the
court adopted the rule of liability without negligence for damage
resulting from blasting operations. The defendant corporation, a
land blasting company, employed a company to level building sites.
Rocks in the land had to be removed by blasting. At the instance of
defendant, the levelling contractor employed another person to do
the blasting with dynamite, and the operations were conducted
under the direct supervision of the defendant's president. A heavy
blast deposited rocks on the roof of the plaintiff's property, damag-
ing the roof, and vibration and concussion from the blast caused
additional damage to the building and contents. Defendant con-
tended that it was not liable for damage caused by vibration and
concussion unless the blasting was negligently done. The Supreme
Court rejected that contention and followed what is stated to be
the majority rule: One who uses blasting material likely to cause
damage to adjoining property is liable if damage to such adjoining
property results, whether from direct impact of rocks thrown out
by the explosion, or from concussion or vibration, and it is not
necessary for the plaintiff to allege or prove negligence to recover
for any damage resulting from this inherently dangerous operation.
LIABILITY FOR INJURY AND DAMAGE FROM INFLAMMABLES
In Grange Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Golden Gas Co.,2 the court
imposed on a dispenser of propane gas the duty to use a high degree
of care commensurate with its dangerous character. Defendant's
employee brought the propane gas to a farm residence in a tank
truck and was transferring the propane from the truck to a storage
tank through a hose. The hose came loose from the storage tank,
apparently because of a defective coupling on the storage tank. The
flow of propane was not entirely cut off. The free end of the hose
whipped around, spraying the house, garage and ground with liquid
propane. An explosion occurred within less than a minute. The
evidence showed that the fire could have been started by any one
or more of three causes: The exhaust from defendant's truck, a
burning pilot light on the line from the storage tank to the house
or the nozzle of the hose striking rocks. The driver had diverted his
1 133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956).
2 133 Colo. 537, 298 P.2d 950 (1956).
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attention to look at something else after he had coupled the hose.
He had not inspected the truck before making the delivery nor
checked to see if the pilot flame was on. The flow of gas was not
automatically cut off when the hose broke. The high court held
that all of these matters showed failure to use the degree of care
required in the handling of propane gas.
In the case of Burley v. MacDowell5 a nine-year-old boy was
denied recovery for injuries sustained in an explosion of gasoline.
Plaintiff was the guest of defendants' child. The boys got the gas
from an outbuilding which they had been forbidden to enter and
brought it into the defendant's residence to use as "fuel" to run
a toy boat motivated by a lighted candle which the boys had been
sailing in the bath tub. The plaintiff testified that he knew the
mixture would burn, and he did not tell defendants he was going
to get it because he knew he was not supposed to go into the build-
ing where it was kept. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
for the defendants, pointing out that the situation was different
from a case in which inflammable and explosive gasoline was kept
in large quantities at a place frequented by children. It was kept
separate and apart in a place where the children had been for-
bidden to go and there was no reason for the defendants to foresee
that the plaintiff would do what he did.
AUTOMOBILE GUEST LAW
In the case of Burrell v. Anderson,' the court again considered
the question whether the evidence in a suit brought by a guest
passenger against his host disclosed anything more than simple
negligence as the cause of the accident. Reviewing the evidence
the court concluded that it disclosed, at most, simple negligence on
the part of the host, of which the plaintiff guest assumed the risk.
Defendant's conduct was the result of a passive mind and not the
result of active and purposeful intent; not conscious, voluntary,
wilful or wanton.
Warner v. Barnard, was a suit by a guest passenger against the
host driver in which the plaintiff alleged that the accident was
caused by the defendant's intoxication and negligence consisting
* 133 Colo. 566, 298 P.2d 399 (1956).
* 133 Colo. 386, 295 P.2d 1039 (1956).
5 304 P.2d 898 (Colo. 1956).
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of a wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of others. On appeal
from a judgment for the defendant on a jury verdict, the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial because of
an erroneous instruction on the issues of liability and because of
error in admitting evidence concerning the damages sustained by
the defendant and his wife for which no claim was made in the suit.
The instruction (to which neither party had objected) told the jury
in substance that if they found that it was equally probable that
the accident was caused by the defendant's simple negligence, his
intoxication or his wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of
others, or by an unavoidable accident, their verdict must be for
the defendant. The court indicated that the instruction might be
clear to a lawyer, but could only be confusing to a jury of laymen
and was clearly erroneous.
DUTY TO BUSINESS INVITEE
In the case of Webb v. Thomas,' the court stated the rule gov-
erning imposition of liability on the possessor of land for injury
to a business patron. To impose liability, two elements must be
present: 1) a realization that the condition constitutes an unreason-
able risk to the patron and 2) the absence of any reason to believe
that the condition will be discovered by the patron or the risk
realized by him. The defendant was the proprietor of a swimming
pool. He had spent time and money studying swimming pools, had
employed the services of a well known swimming pool company to
build the pool and at the time of trial more than 12,000 persons had
used the pool without injury. At about ten o'clock at night the
plaintiff, who had had a few drinks, dove into the water at the
shallow end of the pool and was seriously injured. The water was
three and a half feet deep at that end, and eight and a half feet
deep at the other end. The water was clear and well lighted. The
only diving board was at the deep end. However, there were no
signs showing the depth of the water. The court held that there
was no negligence on the part of the defendant and he could not
reasonably have foreseen that the plaintiff would attempt to dive
into the shallow water.
In the case of Brent v. Bank of Aurora7 the Supreme Court
sustained a judgment on a directed verdict for the defendant in a
case in which the plaintiff, a customer of the defendant bank,
slipped on ice in the bank's parking lot. The Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the ice had been there
long enough and was of such a dangerous character that the bank,
by the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered and
remedied the condition. In fact, there was no evidence as to when
or how the ice got there and no evidence that anyone, even the
plaintiff, saw the ice before the accident.
INNKEEPER's LIABILITY
In Lombardy v. Stees8 a judgment against an innkeeper was
reversed and remanded with direction to dismiss the complaint of
a guest who was assaulted by the defendant's bartender. The court
6 133 Colo. 458, 296 P.2d 1036 (1956).
7 132 Colo. 577, 291 P.2d 391 (1955).
8 132 Colo. 570, 290 P.2d 1110 (1955).
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said that the evidence clearly showed that the only instructions the
defendant had given the bartender were to serve drinks and to
refuse any patron who had had too much. It was clear that the
blow was motivated by a personal insult which the bartender had
received from the plaintiff. The injury was done during the bar-
tender's employment, but not within the scope of his employment,
and for this act of his servant, without his authority, the innkeeper
was not liable.
But another innkeeper's employee subjected his master to
liability by conduct outside the scope and course of his employment
in the case of Bidlake v. Shirley Co.' In this case a guest drove his
car up to the front door of the defendant's hotel and was met by
the defendant's uniformed night porter, who asked the plaintiff
if he wanted the car stored. The plaintiff answered affirmatively
and gave the car keys to the porter, who gave him a claim check.
The procedure authorized by the employer was for the porter to
call a nearby garage, which would send an employee to pick up
the car. Instead of doing that the porter drove the car away on a
"joy ride." The next day, the plaintiff found his car parked on the
street in a damaged condition with valuable personal property
missing from it. The court held that under these circumstances the
plaintiff had a right to assume that the porter had authority to take
possession of the car. The court quoted the statute which provides:
"The landlord or keeper of any hotel or public inn shall not be
liable for loss of or damage to the property of any guest or
patron of such hotel or public inn by fire or by any unforeseen
causes or by inevitable accident, unless such loss of or damage
shall occur on account of his negligence or the negligence of
his servants or employees."'10
The high court cited decisions of other states holding innkeepers
liable in similar fact situations and concluded that under the
evidence the trial court erred in entering judgment for the de-
fendant.
LIABILITY OF CITY AND ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER FOR INJURY TO
PEDESTRIAN FALLING ON CITY-OWNED PARKWAY
In Aikens v. Clayton Trust," the Supreme Court held that
"Plaintiff's own testimony doomed her right of recovery, leaving
no other course for the trial court than to dismiss the complaint."'12
Plaintiff got off a bus at a corner with which she was thoroughly
familiar, started to walk across the "parkway" to the sidewalk,
stepped into a hole in the parkway she knew about and always
tried to avoid, could not step high enough when she tried to step
out of the hole, stubbed her toe, fell all the way across the sidewalk
and onto a low guard railing on the corner of the private property
abutting the sidewalk. She sued the owner of this property and
the city. The city claim was dismissed because of the plaintiff's
failure to give the city notice of the accident within the time re-
quired by the ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the guard
- 133 Colo. 166, 292 P.2d 749 (1956).
'0Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 68-1-11 (1953).
uz 132 Colo. 374, 288 P.2d 349 (1955).
" 132 Colo. at 378, 288 P.2d at 351.
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rail was not a dangerous obstruction and there was no negligence
in installing it where it was. There was nothing to show that
anything the defendants did or did not do.was a proximate cause
of the accident. By way of dictum the court indicated that even
if the city had not been dismissed because notice was not given-
it would not be liable, because the parkway was not a part of the
sidewalk that should be maintained in a safe condition for pe-
destrian use, and the degree of care relative to the parkway area
is of a lower standard than that required in the construction and
maintenance of sidewalks.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
In a common law action against his employer, the plaintiff in
the case of Perry v. Ruybal'3 failed to prove any negligence on the
part of the employer as the cause of his injury. The evidence tended
to show that his own misstep caused his accident, and proved
nothing beyond the mere happening of the accident.
LIBEL AND SLANDER
In Brown v. Barnes," an action for libel and slander, the plain-
tiff alleged that his reputation had been injured and that he had
lost an election in which he was running for re-election as sheriff
because the defendant had said: "The sheriff [plaintiff] has ac-
cumulated property of the value of $80,000. A person cannot ac-
cumulate that much money on a $425.00 salary in a period of 4
years."5
The plaintiff contended that the innuendo of these words was that
he had accumulated property by embezzlement and other dishon-
esty in office. However, he produced no evidence that anyone had
refused to vote for him on account of such statements. He proved
that he had acquired the property during his term of office through
his own work in the real estate business. The defendant pleaded
the truth of the statement as a defense and contended that the
statement was not slanderous per se and did not carry the innuendo
contended for. The Supreme Court upheld the defendant's con-
tention and pointed out that the alleged statement was susceptible
of another meaning-that the plaintiff's preoccupation with his real
13 133 Colo. 502, 297 P.2d 531 (1956).
14 133 Colo. 411, 296 P.2d 739 (1956).
2 s133 Colo. at 412; 296 P.2d at 740.
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estate business precluded adequate performance of his duties as
sheriff. The court also held that there was no proof that the making
of the statement caused the loss of the election.
NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: ISSUE OF FACT OR LAW
IN AUTOMOBILE CASES
In a number of cases, the court wrestled with the question
whether a party's conduct was negligence or contributory negli-
gence or not negligence as a matter of law. Whether or not these
opinions disclose a departure from the basic principle that issues
of negligence are questions of fact probably cannot be determined
at this time.
In one rural intersection accident case, the court upheld the
trial court's finding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law, and in another case arising out of an accident at
the same kind of intersection (except that it was more obstructed)
the court held that the trial court had erred in finding that a driver,
killed in the accident, was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law.
In the first-mentioned case, Bennett v. Hall,16 "... plaintiff was
traveling on a preferred thoroughfare at a speed under the allow-
able limit in the proper lane and having the right of way."' 7 He
first saw the defendant's car when he (plaintiff) was five or six
hundred feet from the intersection, at which time the defendant
was forty-five feet from the intersection. He kept on watching the
defendant, and wondered what the defendant was going to do.
When he was three hundred feet from the intersection, traveling
fifty miles an hour, he lightly touched the brake and slowed to
forty, and when a hundred and twenty-fiv6 feet from the intersec-
tion slammed on the brake and turned to the right but was unable
to avoid hitting the defendant's car. The court held that there
was no doubt that the defendant was negligent, but the plaintiff's
right of way did not relieve him of the duty to use reasonable
care to avoid an accident.
"Plaintiff failed to have his car sufficiently under control to
avoid striking the defendant's car. Plaintiff's failure to guard
against the possibility of the eventuality concerning which he
expressed apprehension certainly furnishes ample ground for a
conclusion that he was contributorily negligent."'8
In the second case, Rigot v. Conda,10 an action by the deceased
driver's personal representative and children, the accident occurred
at a more or less "blind" intersection. The decedent was traveling
on what was posted as a through highway, but at this intersection
the stop sign had been removed. Just before the accident he waved
at a passing driver, and waved at a friend sitting on a porch nearby.
The court said that the facts were entirely different from those of
the Bennett case, in that there was no evidence in the Rigot case
the decendent saw the defendant's truck as it approached the
16 132 Colo. 419, 290 P.2d 241 (1955).
17 132 Colo. at 423, 290 P.2d at 243.
38 132 Colo. at 425, 290 P.2d at 244.
19 304 P.2d 629 (Colo. 1956).
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highway, and it cannot be said that waving at others was con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law.
In several cases the court held that there was no evidence of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff sufficient to
justify the giving of a jury instruction on the doctrine. The plaintiff
in the Sherry case,20 a thirteen year old girl, was attempting to
cross West 8th Avenue at Lipan Street in Denver, from the south-
west to the northwest corner of the intersection. There were no
signal lights. Before stepping into the street she stopped to wait
for traffic. A truck going east in the south lane of traffic stopped
near the crosswalk, and other automobiles traveling east in the
south lane halted behind the truck. The truck driver motioned the
plaintiff to cross. Plaintiff walked in the crosswalk in front of the
truck and was struck by the defendant's car, traveling east in the
north lane of traffic, passing the line of stopped automobiles at a
speed of about twenty-five miles an hour. A city ordinance pro-
hibited passing a vehicle stopped at a crosswalk to permit a pe-
destrian to cross. The Supreme Court held, reversing a jury verdict
for the defendant, that if the plaintiff saw the defendant's car com-
ing she had a right to assume the defendant would stop, and that
giving an instruction on contributory negligence, in the absence of
any testimony, was error, because the jury would have inferred
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The plaintiffs in the Ridenour case2 ' were two women who
were struck by the defendant's car while walking east across Broad-
way in Denver, in a crosswalk, at 12:30 A. M., with a green light.
The defendant, traveling west with the green light, made a left turn
to go south on Broadway and did not see the plaintiffs until he was
about twelve feet from them. He was not traveling at an excessive
rate of speed, but was unable to stop in time to avoid hitting
the plaintiffs after he saw them. The plaintiffs testified that they
looked before crossing the street, and noticed only one car, not the
defendant's, and did not see defendant's car before it hit them.
A city ordinance required the driver to yield the right of way to
pedestrians lawfully within the intersection. The Supreme Court
held that the failure of the plaintiffs to see the defendant's car
was not contributory negligence: "It is obvious they didn't see
defendant's vehicle when they lawfully started to cross the street
because it was not yet in the intersection. 2 2 The court reversed
a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and re-
manded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages only.
In the Stephens case,2 3 the plaintiff, traveling on his own side
of the road, was struck by the defendant's car coming from the
opposite direction. Defendant's explanation was that he lost con-
trol on the icy pavement when he had to turn sharply to the left
to miss a car which had cut in front of him. The court approved
the giving of an unavoidable accident instruction, but reversed
a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and re-
manded the case for a new trial, holding that it was error to give
an instruction on contributory negligence.
In Brakhahn v. Hildebrand24 the Supreme Court held that it
was negligence to move a herd of cattle on a highway at night with
no one in attendance except a man on horseback and another man
in a jeep, the headlights of which faced oncoming cars. The plain-
tiff was a passenger in an automobile which struck the cattle. The
court held that the jury should not have been instructed on con-
tributory negligence, as there was no evidence upon which any
negligence on the part of the driver of the car plaintiff was riding
in could be imputed to plaintiff, and indicated that the defendant's
negligence was negligence as a matter of law.
" Ridenour v. Diffee, 133 Colo. 467, 297 P.2d 280 (1956).
SId. at 471, 297 P.2d at 282.
2Stephens . Lung, 133 Colo. 560, 298 P.2d 960 (1956).
301 P.2d 347 (Colo. 1956).
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Attorney and Client: Conflict of Interest-Professional Ethics-
Government Attorneys
By WALTER I. AURAN
Graduated from the University of North Dakota in 1955 with a B.S. de-
gree, the author is presently a senior at the Universiy of Denver College
of Law.
The United States brought a civil suit to recover funds from
an oil company for alleged overcharges in sales financed under the
Economic Co-operation Act. The Government moved to disqualify
the law firm representing the defendant on the ground that one of
its partners, who was actively working on the case, had been em-
ployed by the Economic Co-operation A'dministration for more than
two of the years during which the alleged overcharges were made.
The attorney had worked in the Paris Office of the ECA but had
not been connected with the particular activities giving rise to the
suit. The court held that the canons of professional ethics of the
American Bar Association did not prohibit the firm from represent-
ing the oil company. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp.
345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Plaintiff brought a civil suit against the United States to re-
cover a sum allegedly due pursuant to contracts between the plain-
tiff and the Veterans Administration. The Government moved to
disqualify the attorney representing the plaintiff on the ground
that he had been formerly employed as a government attorney by
the V. A. and had actually passed upon a number of matters in-
volved in the present suit. The court held that the canons of pro-
fessional ethics of the American Bar Association prohibited the
attorney from representing the plaintiff. Empire Linotype School,
Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
The instant cases involve the principles laid down by Canons
6,1 362 and 37,3 of the American Bar Association's canons of pro-
fessional ethics. These canons are based on the theory that when a
client entrusts an attorney with the handling of a particular mat-
ter, he should be encouraged to reveal to that counsel all the infor-
mation at his disposal, including confidential matter. Once confi-
dence has been reposed, the client must be secure in his belief that
the lawyer, without the client's consent, will be forever barred
from disclosing such confidences, even after termination of the
' Canon 6 provides, in part: "The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or em-
ployment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed." Cf. I Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 141 (1953).
!Canon 36 provides, in part: "A lawyer, having once held pulic office or having been in the
public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter
which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." Id. at 148.
e Canon 37 provides, in part: "it is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences.
This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment . . ." Ibid.
SA[HS-LHWLOR- CoRPORlTIOn SEALS-ALPINE 5-3422
DICTA
Mar.-Apr., 1957
attorney's employment. 4 In addition, courts have interpreted the
canons as imposing a duty upon attorneys to avoid not only the
actuality but the appearance of evil. 5
When disqualification of any attorney has been sought on the
ground that his continued representation of a present client will
violate the confidence of a former client, the complainant normally
is required to prove only a "substantial relationship," not identity,
between the subject matter of the present employment and matters
in which the attorney acted for the former client.6 The complain-
ant need not show that the attorney had actual knowledge of such
substantially related material, but a showing of access to it is suf-
ficient. 7 Such a showing gives rise to an inference that confidential
information was reposed by the former client and the attorney
can thereby be disqualified.8 Thus, it has been held repeatedly that
the knowledge of one member of a law firm will be imputed to all
members and associates of that firm. In the majority of cases in-
volving this question, the offending attorney has either accepted
a retainer from the other side in a retrial of the same case in which
he had formerly represented the complainant,0 or he has taken a
position adverse to a former client in a specific matter in which
he had previously represented that client."
In the Standard Oil case the court had to determine whether
the government attorney employed by the Paris office of the ECA
could be said to have access to substantially related confidential
information in the files of the Washington office. Further, the judge
was required to determine whether the "imputed knowledge" rule
'Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palerma, 121 Cal. App. 2d 616, 264 P. 2d 74, 80 (D. C. A. 3d D.
1953); Note, 64 Yale L. J. 917, 927 (1955).
4See Drinker, Legal Ethics 130-1 (1954).
6T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
' Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros Circuit Management Corp., 216 F. 2d 920, 927 (2d
Cir. 1954).
s Ibid.
0 E. g., Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F. 2d 824, 826-7 (2d Cir. 1955); see
note 7 supra.
10. g., United States v. Bishop, 90 F. 2d 65 (6th Cir. 1937); Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132
(W.D. Wash. 1946); In re Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 202 P. 2d 902, 903 (1949); In re Thenelis, 117 Vt.
19, 83 A. 2d 507 (1951).
u E. g., General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Armour, 125 F. 2d 147 (5th Cir. 1942); Thatcher v.
United States, 212 Fed. 801 (6th Cir. 1914); Sheffield v. State Bar, 22 Cal. 2d 627, 140 P. 2d 376
(1943); Federal Trust Co. v. Damron, 124 Neb. 655, 247 N. W. 589 (1933); Watson v. Watson, 171
Misc. 175, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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applying to ordinary law partnerships should be as strictly applied
when the partnership is in fact the government. However in the
Empire Linotype case the court had to decide only whether the
former government attorney actually had passed on some of the
matters involved in the action. It is significant to note that when
an attorney is employed by the government, the latter is in the
dual position of being the partnership and also the client. There-
fore, even though the "conflicting interests" and "confidential com-
munications" rules of Canons 6 and 37, respectively, still bind the
former government attorney with a duty of fidelity to his client,
that duty should not be applied without reference to the practical
problems encountered when government employed attorneys are
involved. In the Standard Oil case the court recognized these prac-
tical problems by holding that the "access to substantially related
information" rule should not be applied to a government attorney
working for a vast agency where it is shown that he actually did
not receive, investigate or pass upon such confidential infor-
mation.12
As to the imputed knowledge rule, the court in Standard Oil
held that the rule could not be applied to the entire agency in
which the former government attorney had been employed. Rather
its application should be restricted to the particular office of em-
ployment and the specific matters investigated and passed upon by
that office. This rationale was applied in the Empire Linotype case.
As the instant cases point out, ethical problems cannot be
viewed in a vacuum, but must be given a practical approach. This
is important for the benefit of the government which must con-
stantly recruit attorneys from private practice. If service with the
government would tend to disqualify an attorney in too large an
area of law for too long a time, or would prevent his engaging in the
practice of the very specialty for which the government sought his
service, and if that disqualification would infect the firm with
which he becomes associated, the sacrifices of entering government
service would be too great for most men to make. As for men will-
ing to make these sacrifices, not only would they and their firms
suffer restricted practice thereafter, but clients would find it diffi-
cult to obtain specialized counsel.
136 F. Supp. at 363.
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Criminal Law-Habitual Criminal Act-Offense Punishable by
Reformatory Sentence Not Felony
By RICHARD A. ZARLENGO
Richard A. Zarlengo is a student at the University of Denver College of
Law. He was graduated from the University of Colorado in 1953 with a
B. S. in Business degree. He is a member of the Dicta Board of Editors
and has served on the law school Board of Governors.
Theodore William Smalley was convicted in 1932 of burglary
and larceny. At the time of this conviction he was nineteen years of
age and was sentenced in accordance with a state statute requiring,
with certain exceptions, that all male persons over sixteen and un-
der twenty-one years of age who are for the first time convicted of a
felony be sentenced to the state reformatory.' Smalley was later
convicted of grand larceny in 1933, of burglary and grand larceny
in 1936, and of burglary in 1946. He was sentenced to the state
penitentiary for each of the latter convictions. As a result of these
four convictions, Smalley was sentenced to life imprisonment un-
der the Colorado habitual criminal act.2 The latter statute provides
life imprisonment for one convicted of four felonies. Smalley filed
a motion to set aside his life sentence on the grounds that it was
void and erroneous. The Colorado Constitution defines a felony as
"any criminal offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the
penitentiary and no other."' It was Smalley's contention that since
a reformatory sentence was mandatory by statute he could not
have been sentenced to the state penitentiary and, therefore, his
first conviction was not a felony conviction as defined by the Colo-
rado Constitution. The district court overruled the motion, but was
reversed by the Supreme Court on the grounds that under the
Colorado Constitution the test of a felony is the possible form of
punishment and place of confinement in case of conviction. Since
the place of confinement prescribed by statute in this case was the
reformatory, the offense could not have been a felony. Smalley v.
People,.304 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1957).
It is well established in Colorado that the test of whether or
not an offense is a felony as defined in the constitution depends on
the punishment prescribed by the legislature and not on the sen-
tence actually imposed on the defendant in a given case.4 If an
offense is punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary,
it is a felony even though the legislature allows the court to pre-
scribe a lesser punishment at its discretion and the court does, in
fact, impose such lesser punishment on the defendant. 5 In its posi-
tion on this point, the Colorado Supreme Court seems to be in
accord with the majority of other jurisdictions having similar defi-
nitions of felony.6
An analysis of the briefs in the Smalley case indicates that
what was in effect presented was the question whether an objective
,Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-10-1 (1953).
Id. § 39-13-1.
3Cala. Canst. Art. XVIII, § 4 (1876)
. People Y. Gadding, 55 Colo. 579, 136 Pac. 1011 (1913) (cited with approval in Smalley).
5 Ibid.
a See, e.g., Bards v. United States, 224 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1956); Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App.




or a subjective test should be applied to each case in determining
if the individual involved has committed a felony. If an objective
test were to be applied, the individual involved would be ignored
and only the offense committed would be considered. If the statute
making the act a crime provides for punishment by death or im-
prisonment in the state penitentiary, the offense would be classified
as a felony and the fact that a certain defendant could not be sent
to the penitentiary because of age would be immaterial. If a sub-
jective test be applied, each individual defendant would be con-
sidered and whether a felony has been committed would not de-
pend on the offense committed but would depend on the maximum
sentence which could be imposed on that individual taking into
consideration all of the statutes governing the sentencing of that
individual.
In the Smalley case the majority of the court chose to follow
the latter of these alternatives thus establishing that a person can
commit a felony only if the maximum sentence which may be im-
posed upon him is death or imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
It should be stressed that the decision in this case does not make
the sentence actually imposed on an individual the test of a felony.
The test is what sentence could have been imposed on that in-
dividual.
As a result of the Smalley case, the statute dealing with re-
formatory sentencing7 was amended by the 1957 session of the
legislature.8 As amended, it leaves to the trial court's discretion
whether a person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five
years of age who has been convicted of a felony should be sen-
tenced to the reformatory or to the penitentiary. Since the test is
the sentence which can be imposed and not the sentence actually
imposed, the result of this amendment is to make future offenders
sixteen years of age and older guilty of felonies if the crimes for
which they are convicted carry possible penitentiary sentences
even if the judge, in his discretion, actually imposes reformatory
sentences. As to anyone presently serving a sentence as a habitual
criminal because of any "felony" conviction before he reached the
age of twenty-one, the amendment does not affect his right to be
released because he could not have been sentenced to the peniten-
tiary at the time of his conviction under the statute then in effect
and, therefore, his offense was not a felony.
See note 1 supra.




24 HOUR BREAKFAST AND LUNCH SERVICE
At 1649 Broadway Denver
DICTA
Mar.-Apr., 1957
A.B.A. MOUNTAIN AND PLAIN MEETING
More than 1,000 attorneys from an eight-state area are expect-
ed to attend the American Bar Association Mountain and Plain
Regional Meeting to be held in Denver May 9-11. Registration and
hotel accommodation applications went forth about March 1 with
the first mailing to attorneys throughout Arizona, Colorado, Kan-
sas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming.
All lawyers-whether or not they are ABA members-are in-
vited to attend the regional meeting, according to Edward G.
Knowles, Denver and Thomas M. Burgess, Colorado Springs, co-
chairmen. Registration fee for attorneys is $10. For law students, it
is $2.
Registration and hotel accommodation applications should be
mailed as soon as possible to Mountain and Plain Regional Commit-
tee, 560 Denver Club Building, Denver 2, Colorado. Rooms can be
reserved only for those who have paid the meeting registration fee
in advance. Applications should not, however, be accompanied by
payment for hotel accommodations.
Institutes, seminars and conferences will include: mineral law,
bar activities, insurance law, unauthorized practice, patent law,
junior law, labor relations, taxation, judicial administration, Amer-
ican citizenship, judicial selection, municipal law, administrative
law, legal assistance, lawyers referral, and corporation, banking
and business law, Real Estate, probate and trust.
The Cosmopolitan will be the headquarters hotel, and space
will also be available in several other good hotels near the Cosmo-
politan. Hotel space will be assigned in order of registrations
received.
NOTICE
All members of the Bar are invited to attend a symposium
on procedural problems in tax matters, following a short busi-
ness meeting of the Tax Section.
Date: Friday, April 19th
Time: 2:00 to 5:00 p.m.
Place: Farmers Union Auditorium
Director George Allan of the Federal Internal Revenue Serv-
ice and Mr. Harold Drake of the State of Colorado Revenue
Department will be on the panel with respect to procedural
problems at administrative levels and Messrs. Claude Maer, Jr.,
Frank Cavanagh, Everett Smith and Stanley L. Drexler will be
on the panel with respect to procedural questions in Tax Court
and in District Court tax suits.
ADMISSION WILL BE FREE
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